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I. Introduction
Like many another promising youth, the administrative process is
having a so-so middle age. Regarded as vigorous and idealistic when
young, administrative agencies came to be regarded as slack, partisan,
and possibly corrupt by the 1950's. When they were first widely in-
stituted, agencies were to perform Herculean tasks with which no leg-
islature or court could cope. Where legislatures were unable to
devise precise rules for an unforeseen future, agencies were to con-
centrate their energies on filling out the legislative design; where
courts were unable to inform themselves about the complexities of
modern industry, agencies were to collect data and fashion remedies
for unique problems in many different segments of an industrial
society.1 The sheer bulk and variety of problems requiring rules and
decisions had threatened to overwhelm the whole governmental pro.
cess, and the administrative agencies were set up as a kind of defense.
But, as happens so often, yesterday's reform has become today's prob-
lem. 2
Administrative law results from a system of interacting elements.
Major policy decisions are made by the legislature and subsidiary rules
are promulgated by an agency. The agency also hears and decides cases,
subject to court review, in which private compliance with statute and
agency-declared norms is the major issue. The legislature, the agency,
and the courts periodically affect one another's attitudes and actions.
This description of the circulatory system of the administrative pro-
cess, however, lacks little-except the blood.
1. J. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 13-15, 17, 23 (1938). This expansive view of
their role reflects the temper of the New Deal, at least among the liberal academic com.
munity. One can readily understand how the business community feared many such
agencies then.
In the New Deal era, "independent agencies" were set up because of distnist of regular
departmental personnel. Witte, Administrative Agencies and Statute Late Maling, 2
PuB. ADMIN. REv. 116, 117 (1942).
2. See generally, J. LANDIS, REPORT ON REGULArTORY AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT.ELE-'T,
Part I, 4-35 (1960). (Also printed as STAFF OF THE SENATE COUTxrrEE ON TIlE JUDicIARy,
RPORT ON REGULATORY AGENCIES, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960).)
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Interaction of the regulated with the regulators is perhaps the most
crucial element in the process. The perceived nature of private conduct,
for example, shapes the form of legislation and the design of the
machinery to administer it, while the more detailed patterns of pri-
vate conduct as seen by the administrative agency have a strong influ-
ence on subsidiary legislation and individual case decisions. Meanwhile,
private parties carry appeals from agency decisions to the courts and
occasionally to the legislature, and they influence executive appoint-
ments to the agency. How the agency and the special public subject
to its authority keep apprised of each other's activities constitutes a
major, if often elusive, element in the administrative process. For the
process to succeed, the agency must understand the conduct it seeks to
regulate, while the public must comprehend the rules under which it
must act.
Rejuvenation of the administrative agencies has been sought in many
reforms, few of which have come to pass. One such proposal, suggested
by a handful of scholars, judges, and bar groups, and further considered
in the following pages, urges those agencies which possess both rule
making and adjudicatory authority-notably the National Labor Rela-
tions Board-to make greater use of their rule making powers. 3 But
as is common with the objects of reform, some agencies, including the
Board, have resisted the proposal. In N.L.R.B. v. Wyman-Gordon Co.,4
however, the Supreme Court for the first time implied that in some
situations an agency possessing both rule making and adjudicatory
authority must employ the former,5 thus calling into question a long-
3. H. FRIENDLY, THE FEDE AL AWiNITr ATrvE AGEN ciEs 146-47 (196n [hereinafter cited
as FRIENDLY'S AGENcIs]; I K. DAVIS, ADMnINISTRATIVE Ltav TRF.ATISE § 6.13 (1965 Pocket
Part) [hereinafter dted as DAVIS' TREATISE]; The American Bar Association House of
Delegates at the instance of its Section of Administrative Law, 16 ADin. L , REv. 77 (1964);
and the House of Delegates at the instance of the Section of Labor Relations Law, 42
LAB. REL. REP. 513 (1958); Peck, The Atrophied Rule Making Powers of the Aational
Labor Relations Board, 70 YALE LJ. 729 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Pec's Atrophy];
Shapiro, The Choice of Rule Making or Adjudication in the Development of Adminis.
trative Policy, 78 I-IRv. L. REV. 921, 942 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Shapiro's Choice];
Wason, The National Labor Relations Act and the National Labor Relations Board in
Hearings on Congressional Oversight of Administrative Agencies (National Labor Rela-
tions Board) Before the Subcommittee on Separation of Powms of the Senate Comniittee
on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968) [hereinafter referred to as Ervin Hearings].
The Board's power to make rules is found in section 6 of the National Labor Relations
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 156 (1964):
The Board shall have authority from time to time to make, amend, and rescind.
in the manner prescribed by the Administrative Procedure Act, such rules and
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act.
4. S94 U.S. 759 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Wyman-Gordon].
5. This summary employs what might be called "opening paragraph license." Part IV
provides a guided tour through the cobwebs of the decision which one takes at his own
risk. It is not a trip for the squeamish.
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standing belief verging on doctrine6 that an agency can choose between
the two procedures.7 Most agencies have chosen adjudication, and the
NLRB has been the most monogamous of all. After all these years
of fidelity (as with many long marriages, all has not been bliss, but a
strong sense of attachment has grown up) must the Board take rule
making, Leah as well as Rachel, to its unwilling bosom? Should it do
so, not simply from compulsion, but for the children's sake?
II. Inadequacies of the National Labor Relations Board
A. The NLRB: Its Machinery and Role
The National Labor Relations Board is like most administrative
agencies. A five member Board sits at its apex and is empowered to
"prevent" unfair labor practices and to determine who, if anyone, is
the freely chosen exclusive representative of employees in appropriate
units for purposes of collective bargaining. For the thirty-four years
of the Board's life its members have discharged these functions almost
exclusively by deciding contested cases in the manner of an appellate
court.
8
While some berate it for failing to do so, the Board cannot simply
apply the National Labor Relations Act in the sense of reading its text
and deciding cases according to its manifest dictates. Portions of the
Act dating from 1935 are extremely broad and general; and while the
1947 and 1959 amendments were more detailed than their forerunners,
the language frequently remains inconclusive and requires considerable
interpretation. Over the years the Board necessarily has made law; it
could not help doing so.9
When the Board does make policy,10 it should base its decisions on
6. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
7. E.g., 1 DAvis' TREaTisE, supra note 3, § 5.01.
8. On rare occasions press releases have announced new policy. Agency members also
make speeches, which are indicative of policy but not binding on the agency.
9. Summers, Politics, Policy Making and the NLRB, 6 SYRAcusr L. R v. 93 (1954).
Much the same point is made with more recent illustrations in Winter, Judicial Reicleu
of Agency Decisions: The Labor Board and the Court, 1968 SuerzMiE COuRT Rv., 53, 54-67.
This does not mean that the Board's legislative function is boundless; on the con.
trary, the statute provides the limits. Within the confines of the statute, however, the
courts permit the exercise of legislative power, albeit unevenly and rather unpredictably.
E.g., compar NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963) (the Board may balancethe impact of employer conduct on protected activity and em loyer business jbstification
in an economic strike) with NLRB v. Insurance Agents Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960)
(the Board may not decide what are permissible bargaining weapons).
10. Policy shifts by new majorities effected by new presidential appointments usually
are deplored as unprincipled. I suggest that, within bounds not readily defined, such a
process of change is not only justifiable but desirable. We take for granted that statutes
once enacted continue in force until a later legislature takes affirmative action by a
fresh majority to repeal or amend. Few statutes other than appropriation measures are
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the realities of industrial relations: indeed, that was the major reason
for creating the Board. Only thus can it fashion rules of conduct that
promote healthy labor relations and reduce rather than stimulate
litigation. The Board's habitual practices, however, seem ineffective
in stemming an ever freshening flood of cases. In a recent year, the
Board members themselves decided about 1,200 contested cases (roughly
740 unfair labor practice cases and 450 representation cases)." Board
trial examiners heard and decided, subject to appeal to the Board, about
1,500 unfair labor practice cases, while the regional directors decided
over 2,500 representation cases. During the same fiscal year, the entire
agency received some 30,425 new cases and closed 29,494 cases. The
overwhelming bulk of these cases were handled administratively and
either withdrawn, dismissed, settled, or carried through the election
procedure by party consent without hearings. In understanding and
assessing the Board's performance, and that of many other agencies, it
is crucial to bear in mind the necessity of informal administrative dis-
position of all but a small fraction of the case load.
enacted for limited periods; practically none expires with the legislature that enacted
it despite the sometimes tenuous majority that enacted it. Although that majority
no longer commands voter support, its law continues in force until a new coalition can
be mustered to enact a new statute-a formidable task because not only must the old
statute be repealed but a successor must be fashioned in a very complex process of ac-
commodation. A famous example exists in labor-management relations. The only Re-
publican Congress in a period of twenty years enacted the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947.
A Democratic resurgence featured by the success of candidates prominently pledged to
that statute's repeal failed to achieve the announced goal. For a dozen years, therefore,
the measure continued in force with only slight, primarily technical, amendment. Only
in 1959 were significant amendments made despite repeated attempts in both houses,
and these were not achieved until the proponents of internal union reform legislation
found it necessary to broaden the base of Congressional support.
The administration of a statute like the National Labor Relations Act requires the
continual balancing of competing claims. The task is not a simple one. Congress is in-
capable of making required adjustments in the balance as they seem to become necessary
but, by convulsive effort, at rather substantial intervals, it does make some gross adjust-
ments in response to major shifts in political forces. In the interim, it is undemocratic
to permit an evanescent majority to work its will unabated after it no longer commands
that majority. The unavoidable periodic selection of a President enables new majorities
(coalitions of minorities) to obtain political power which carries the authority to make
appointments to agencies. These new appointees reflect the most recent political align-
ment and, by new policy decisions, ameliorate the rigors of existing legislation. Of
course, it can be argued that the electorate does not vote on transportation, labor, or
dozens of other policies when it chooses a President. But in a generil way it does. The
interest groups usually know the stakes and support those candidates who are believed
well disposed to their interests. The electorate at large knows the general orientation of
the major parties and the presidential candidates, probably more clearly in the area of
labor relations than in most. Hence, they vote for policy changes, albeit within limits
set by existing statutes (which may afford considerable latitude). Thus vieved the policy
shifts of newly-constituted majorities are democratic means of preventing long.dead
majorities from ruling from the grave. The appropriations process, with its reordering
of priorities and its extensive influence upon executive and administrative personnel,
constitutes another "informal" amendatory process despite the bans upon substantive
legislation in appropriation measures.
11. 32 N.L.R.B. ANN. RiP. 9-14 (1967).
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Two major features of the Board's habitual mode must be con-
sidered in assessing its performance: long delays and delphic opin-
ions. The most constant criticism of the Board over the years concerns
delay in administrative case processing and, even more, in Board
decision making.12 Delay often unsettles the parties and the work pro-
cess, and the ultimate decision frequently comes too late to provide a
meaningful remedy.13
The opinions in cases acted on directly by the Board members tend
to be brief and require, for their full understanding, a reading of the
usually lengthy, always detailed, Trial Examiner Decisions. 14 Even
the more extended opinions need such supplementation, and a large
proportion of Board decisions do not reveal the members' reasoning.
Professor Lesnick undoubtedly expresses the opinion of legions of labor
lawyers that often the Board
doesn't state the grounds of what it is doing, it doesn't explain
itself. It has a passion for what it views as case-by-case decisionmak-
ing; that is to say, simply state [sic] the facts and without really
attempting to come to grips with the concrete issues, say, "we think
on all the facts and circumstances this is the answer." 15
It is important, of course, that Board opinions are often long in
forthcoming and short in substance, but more important still are the
questions of whether this method of decision and policy making enables
the Board to inform itself adequately about the reality of industrial
relations-whether it can acquire the special knowledge it was created
to accumulate-and whether emphasis upon individual case decisions
12. This was the principal criticism of the distinguished tri-partite committee headed
by Professor Archibald Cox, THE SENATE ADVISORY PANEL ON LABOR-MANAGE iENT RELA-
TIONS LAw, ORGANIZATION AND PROCEDURE OF Tim NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONs BOARD, S.
Doc. No. 81, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960).
13. Samoff, Taft-Hartley Discrimination Victories, 17 LAB. L.J. 6,13 (1966). This Is a
rare example of the exploration of the effects in practice of Board doctrine.
14. These were formerly called Intermediate Reports. The Trial Examiner Decisions
frequently discuss the interpretation and application of court and Board dec1lon=,.
Their potential importance is attested to by a comment of the Chairman of the NLRB,
who once referred to "relevant Trial Examiner Decisions I had not even read." (He was
not talking about decisions pertinent to cases in which he participated, but those per-
taining to unresolved "controversial issues.") Procedures Employed by the NLRB in
Determining Policy, address to the A.B.A. Section on Administrative Law, reprinted fi
Ervin Hearings, supra note 3, 1237. For the most part, however, Trial Examiner Decisions
are studied only by the parties to the particular case, reviewing courts, and those pre-
paring briefs in later cases. Even the most expert in the field seldom have the time to
resort to these decisions to learn, if possible, what the Board has decided. They do not
become part of the current kit which labor specialists use regularly.
15. His oral testimony in Ervin Hearings, supra note 3, Part I at 528. For a minor
example on a procedural point that came to hand at random, see Int'l. Bhd. of Electrical
Workers (Asplundh Tree Expert Co.), 161 N.L.R.B. 1397 (1966).
576
Vol. 79: 571, 1970
Rule Making and the NLRB
provides adequate guidance to those subject to the National Labor
Relations Act.
B. How the Board Informs Itself
Unlike some other administrative agencies, the Board itself cannot
initiate its own processes. Rather, its ability to act on a particular
matter depends, in the first instance, on the filing of an unfair
labor practice charge or a petition in a representation case by an
outside party. Lacking independent authority to investigate or
oversee the industrial scene generally, the Board frequently
becomes aware of a problem . . . only when it is raised in the
context of a particular case. Thus, the bulk of the Board's experi-
ence has been accumulated through the adjudication of issues
brought to it by outside parties.""
One may wonder whether such a limited diet is nutritious. Except
for a portion of their representation case load, which occupies a small
segment of their attention, the Board members are preoccupied with
labor litigation which Willard Wirtz, in another context, observed,
"Coffers no real insight into the basic laws of decent labor relations."'--
Litigation occurs where labor-management relations have been dis-
rupted, if they ever existed. Seeing only diseased conditions, he argued,
is a dubious way of becoming acquainted with healthy labor relation-
ships. Nor do Board members experience extensive exposure to indus-
trial relations outside of litigation. The Board's staff consists mostly
of lawyers and a few researchers who are primarily concerned with the
statistics of the Board's own operations", and with legal case analysis.
Board members and senior staff address and meet with industry, union
groups, and bar representatives and appear before Congressional com-
mittees. Although at least some of these occasions must be useful to
16. Brief of the NLRB at 15-16, N.L.R.B. v. Wyman-Gordon, 394 US. 759 (1969). It also
declares in a footnote to this passage:
Congress' unwillingness to grant the Board such powers [of overseeing the industrial
scene] is reflected in § 4(a) of the Act, which precludes the Board from appointing
"individuals for the purpose of conciliation or mediation, or for economic analysis."
The language quoted from the Act originated in the 1947 Taft-Hartley amendments.
The legislative history lacks any indication of the motivation or extent of the provision
beyond a plaintive note by opponents of the bill that it was senseless because the Board
had abolished its Bureau of Economic Research in 1940. S. MINom REP. No. 105, Pt. 2,
80th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1947), LEG. Hisr. OF LABOR MA1NAGEmr RELATio.s Acr 495.
17. Wirtz, On Teaching Labor Law, 42 ILL. L. REv. 1, 4 (1947) (emphasis omitted).
18. The Board keeps tab on its own operations as revealed in statistics published in
its annual reports. They are valuable in monitoring the Board's handling of its caseload,
case trends (e.g., the shift in the late 50's to a preponderance of unfair labor practice
cases), the showing of various unions in elections, and the Board's box score in the
courts.
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their education, irregular meetings can not substitute for purposeful,
methodical study.
Board members and staff also have recourse to the considerable
literature of the labor economists (even if they cannot be employed,
they can be read) which today rarely has relevance to NLRA problems.1"
The Bureau of Labor Statistics and Bureau of Labor Standards produce
an occasionally pertinent study, but they too generally focus attention
elsewhere. Board and court decisions involving the Act receive much
critical gloss from practitioners and academics. While they may produce
some doctrinal tidiness, they seldom enlarge the Board's knowledge of
the real world of labor-management relations.
What the Board lacks notably is (1) specific information about labor.
management practices and employee attitudes and reactions that may
be pertinent to its work, and (2) any systematic means of monitoring
the impact of Board and court NLRB doctrines upon industrial prac-
tice. Apparently it even lacks a mechanism for mobilizing the consider-
able expertise of its own regional staffs, who learn a great deal about
labor relations that does not become part of the hearing transcript upon
which the Board's Washington staff battens. Thus, the Board's decision-
making fails to provide a bridge between Board members, their staff,
and the real world of labor relations. In addition to or perhaps as a
result of these handicaps, it is doubtful that the Board effectively com-
municates its policy decisions to those who should shape their conduct
to conform to the Act.
C. Fibreboard: A Case Study of the Inadequacy of Adjudication
The Fibreboard20 decision serves as an example of some of the short-
comings of adjudication. The case was initiated by unfair labor practice
charges filed in July, 1959,21 but the NLRB decision was not handed
down until 1962 and was not finally enforced until after the Supreme
Court decision of 1964.22 Because the case resulted in a Supreme Court
opinion, it can be assumed that a majority of labor law specialists would
be familiar with it.23 While the Supreme Court's opinion affirming the
19. E.g., the whole of 21 IND. & LAB. REL. REV. has but one directly NLRA-relatcd
article, Krislov, Union Organizing of New Units, 1955-1966, id., at 31 (1967). The article
analyzed the Board's own statistics, and thus brought no fresh information to the Board
otherwise unavailable to it.
20. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., (supplemental Decision and Order), 188 N.L.R.B.
550 (1962), enforced, 322 F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir. 1963), afJ'd, 379 U.S. 203 (1964). The various
decisions called forth a vast literature of exegesis, which I hardly need augment.
21. 379 U.S. at 207.
22. See note 20, supra.
23. See p. 585, infra.
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NLRB decision seemed narrow, the labor-management community
apparently seldom doubted that the case generally stood for the prop-
osition that an employer contemplating the subcontracting of work
being performed by employees represented by a union has the obliga-
tion, under section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act, to
bargain over the subcontracting decision itself and not merely over its
effects upon the employees involved. In my questionnaire survey2 con-
ducted a bit more than four years after the Supreme Court decision
and more than six years after the Board's final decision, I set out to
ascertain what impact the decision actually had had on bargaining and
subcontracting of unit work, i.e., to see if Fibreboard was compatible
with industrial reality.
As a rationale for its bargaining requirement in Fibreboard, the
Board offered the following:
Experience has shown, however, that candid discussion of mutual
problems by labor and management frequently results in their reso-
lution with attendant benefit to both sides. Business operations
may profitably continue and jobs may be preserved.2
The Supreme Court echoed the same idea, albeit with reserve. -"0 Thus
it seemed appropriate to attempt to ascertain whether this expectation
had been realized to any appreciable degree. My questionnaire asked
whether over the past decade the respondent's clients had had problems
concerning subcontracting, what legal doctrines or documents affected
the handling of such problems, and whether bargaining about subcon-
tracting had led to the modification or cancellation of a company deci-
sion to subcontract work.27
Most of those who responded reported that subcontracting had been
an active and common issue with their clients or organizations. Fibre-
board, and its predecessor, Town & Country Alfg. Co.,28 were chief
among the sources of legal doctrine to which the lawyers resorted in
dealing with the problem.29 The overwhelming majority of those who
answered the last question about cancellation or modification of sub-
24. See pp. 582-83, infra.
25. 138 N.L.R.B. at 551, quoting Town & Country Mfg. Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 1022, 1027
(1962).
26. See 879 U.S. at 214.
27. This last question was somewhat garbled in the questionnaire and ld to a few non-
responses. By and large, however, respondents seem to have divined what the question
meant as indicated by their frequent written comments.
28. Supra note 25.
29. N.B. Law teachers who bear down on what Fibreboard means: no one volunteered
that either the Board or court doctrines were unclear, although a question on impact was
quite open-ended.
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contracting decisions replied that bargaining had not caused a modifica-
tion or abandonment of the decision to shift work out of the unit,"
Even more impressive was the certainty and vehemence of many inter-
viewees and questionnaire respondents that the bargaining requirement
has no practical meaning. In typical replies, management lawyers, for
example, characterized the requirement as
a charade; we just go through the pretense of bargaining.
It means more lawyers' fees, but it makes no difference in the end.
[M]anagement play-acts. We go through a routine of pretending
to let the union participate in the decision and after hours of taking
a lot of guff, we write a carefully drawn letter, going ahead.
(Emphasis in original.)
Of seven union lawyers who responded to both questions, two re-
ported an affirmative impact. Of the latter, one's comment was unde-
cipherable; the other's indicated that under contracts known to him,
joint labor-management boards in the trucking industry pass upon em-
ployer subcontracting proposals, approving some and modifying or
turning down others. Whether the arrangement grew out of the Town
& Country-Fibre board line of decisions did not affirmatively appear.
These results suggest, at the least, that there is serious question
whether Fibreboard is working out as the Board majority had antici-
pated and the Supreme Court was led to believe it might. I feel con-
siderable concern that a major Board doctrine is regarded so widely as
a meaningless bother or worse. The disrespect engendered hardly con-
duces compliance with other Board doctrines. In the particular area
concerned, it may not only be unproductive of the intended results,
but positively mischievous. Employees often are unrealistic about threats
to continued employment. 1 If the union representative sets out to bar-
gain about keeping the work within the unit (a hopeless proposition),
all concerned may neglect to formulate devices to cushion the loss that
is almost sure to take place. This might lead to bargaining about the
wrong issue. One management respondent indicated that this had been
his experience: union members were unprepared, chagrined and embit-
tered about the eventual discontinuance of work.
30. Of the 46 management attorneys whose clients or organizations had subcontracting
problems and who answered the last question, 34 replied in the negative. The commentS
of several of those who knew of such changes indicated that they were referring to single
instances among many subcontracting situations.
31. Several studies show that even in the face of plant shutdowns with no realistic
prospects of reopening, many employees hope that their old jobs will become available
and some even base job decisions on such unrealistic hopes. See, e.g., R. WILCOCK, COM-
MUNITY AND WORKER REACTIONS TO A PERMANENT PLANT SHUTDOWN IN A DL,'REssrv AnrA,
U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATisrIcs, DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 1254 (1954).
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The Board probably could not have known in 1962 that its Fibre-
board decision might prove meaningless, although the majority indi-
cated it was well aware that employers would not have to agree to abstain
from subcontracting. Perhaps the majority members were naive about
the possibility that an employer would change its decision once it con-
cluded that subcontracting would be financially advantageous.32 A
realistic assessment of the likelihood of an employer changing his mind,
however, might have emerged from a rule making proceeding on the
subject.
I suggest that, at the least, the Board should seek organized hindsight.
It should have a regular research procedure for monitoring the effects
of its decision in action. 3 Moreover, the rule making process offers the
Board a splendid source of information on the operation of its policies.
If the potential parties to such undertakings are informed of the kinds
of field research in which the Board has an interest, many will under-
take it. There are problems with partisan research, but once the Board
establishes that it will disregard slanted questionnaires and biased
samples, it probably will get what it wants.
The Fibreboard experience makes clear what can happen if the Board
regards its task merely as one of exegesis aided by expertise in what it
already knows. But the Board has several complementary tasks, includ-
ing the long neglected function of actively informing itself about the
changing world of many different kinds of unions, employees and man-
agements. The term quasi-judicial agency may mean less than a court
in terms of authority; but it also should mean more than a court in
terms of information gathering.
32. After all, the employer has unusual initiative in the situation both in proposing
and in implementing the change after bargaining to a deadlock. The Board and Supreme
Court both regarded Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Chicago 8- N.W. R. Co., 362 U.S.
330 (1960), as dispositive of whether discontinuance of unit work is a mandatory subject
of bargaining. The Chicago & Northwestern case involved the propriety of a federal court
injunction restraining union action in support of a demand that the carrier bargain over
a union-proposed contract provision not to abandon agencies (stations) without an agree-
ment. That such an issue may be a mandatory bargaining subject under the Railway
Labor Act, as the Court indicated does not mean necessarily that something Somewhat
similar should be so classified under the NLRA. Under the former the union has real
bargaining power due to its ability to prevent a carrier from changing its operations until
time-consuming bargaining procedures are exhausted. In the NLRA situation the union
is virtually powerless in most situations. Once the employer bargains to impasse, it may
put the change into effect; NLRB v. Crompton-Highway Mills, 337 U.S. 217, 225 (1919);
NLRB v. U.S. Sonics Corp., 312 F.2d 610, 615 (Ist Cir. 1963); Pacific Gamble Robinson
Co. v. NLRB, 186 F.2d 106 (6th Cir. 1950). Under such differing rules of the game,
bargaining can mean markedly different things. Concluding that one is just like the other
can result only from a lack of information or a lack of analysis.
33. The Board should take its case for a research program to Congress. And if the
labor-management community is interested in realistic Board decisions, it ought to support
such a program.
581
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 79: 571, 1970
I suggest that an enormous number of Board doctrines are based
upon untested suppositions. For example, we have had more than
twenty-five years of litigation about organizing activities on and off
company property but little data on how employees actually react to
various organizing devices. We simply do not know what makes an
employee feel fear in election situations.3 We do not even know
whether substantial groups of employees regard Board elections as
truly secret. If many do not, the whole Board election process is askew.
What the Board needs is a body of information it has not been get-
ting. Whenever the Board is able to obtain such information, however,
the data and conclusions should be subject to critical commentary by
the affected public and interested critics before the Board acts upon it.
For that task, formal rule making on notice seems indispensable.
D. Communication from Board to Bar
Beyond the problem of how the Board informs itself in order to
reach its own decisions is the problem of how the Board informs the
labor bar of the meaning of its decisions once they are made. An agency
like the NLRB, which has the authority to interpret the law, also has
the obligation to communicate the law's requirements in such a way
as to maximize ready understanding, and hence observance, of them.
I developed a questionnaire to ascertain (among other things) the
extent to which labor lawyers obtain accurate information about devel-
opments in labor law and feel adequate to their counseling tasks. I first
34. Although Professor (now Dean) Bok's analysis of the problems and Issues In-
volved in Board election proceedings is superb, it has, I suggest, a major flaw. He wrote:
If the Board were to rely upon evidence obtained from the voters themselves, It
would be necessary in a disputed election to elicit testimony from a large number of
individuals in order to determine the actual (net) effect of particular campaign tactics,
for although some employees may be intimidated by coercive tactics, others may vote
against the party indulging in such behavior due to motives of resentment. Se, e.g.,
Buter, Factors Affecting Trade Union Organizing of Manufacturing Firms in Iowa,
1946-1957 (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Univ. of Wisconsin (1959)). Hence, very cum.
bersome investigations would have to be made in a large number of cases. Moreover,
the testimony received would often be unreliable both because voters may be largely
unaware of the true reasons for their ultimate decision and because testimony might
be slanted due to fear of reprisal from the employer of a desire to assist the union's
cause.
Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections Under the National
Labor Relations Act, 78 HARV. L. REv. 38, 40, n.8 (1964).
It is not necessary to query voters in each election. The results of such an enterprise
could be misleading for the reasons put forward by Bok. But field research could elicit
information about what kinds of communications register with employees, a major point
of dispute now resolved primarily on the basis of supposition. In a well-designed survey,
the respondents will not be aware of the thrust of the inquiry. My favorite example of
good research design is that of subjects led into a room full of wires and a wired chair
in which they were to be seated. The subjects were told that there was some electrical
trouble and that when it was untangled they would be brought back to be tested, They
were asked to wait in a designated place. The investigators wanted to study reactions to
stress. The real test took place in the "waiting" room unbeknownst to the subjects.
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interviewed eight labor law specialists (four representing management
and four, unions) in different cities and pre-tested the questionnaire.
Then I mailed the questionnaire to almost one-tenth the membership
of the American Bar Association's Section on Labor Relations Law.
About 25% responded.35 Of the respondents, 17% represent unions
and 80% serve management (either in private practice or as house
counsel). The other respondents either represent both, hold public
office, or arbitrate.
Management respondents generally spend less than half their labor
relations working hours on matters involving the National Labor Rela-
tions Act,3 6 but more than half the union lawyers (a very small sample,
I should note) devote 50 percent of their labor law time to this subject
area. The remainder of their time is consumed by activities such as
arbitration work, negotiations, and for some, considerable involvement
in equal opportunity problems. Except for a handful, therefore, labor
law specialists (particularly those representing management) must be
informed on many non-NLRA areas of labor relations law which com-
prise the bulk of their practice.
A considerable amount of all labor relations legal work involves
counseling, which frequently requires the provision of advice on very
short notice. Respondents indicate that much advice is rendered im-
mediately and that many problems "require" an answer within the
same working day.3 7 The questionnaire also asked:
85. The respondents were assured anonymity and most used the plain white vrappers
provided for mailing their replies, a factor which I believe enhances the candor of the
answers. In addition to showing whether the responding attorney represents management
or unions, other characteristics such as age, length of labor practice, size of firm or staff,
number of associates specializing in labor work, and name of city were obtained. These
variables did not make any discernible difference in the responses concerning counseling
and case decision reading habits. The kindness and sense of obligation of members who
replied are greatly appreciated. Even greater thanks are due those members, including
members of the Section Council, who set aside generous amounts of vorking time to
pretest the questionnaire and discuss the problems it covered with me.
The totals and percentages reported in the text include questionnaires answered by
those interviewed and some of their associates. But questionnaires of those reporting that
labor law work takes less than 25% of their time were excluded. Most respondents were
included.
While the questionnaire may not conclusively "prove" my argument that adjudicatory
decision-making is an inadequate way for the Board to communicate to the bar, the re-
sults at least suggest such a conclusion.
86. In the management sample of 65 only one respondent reported 100% of his time
devoted to NLRA matters; one reported 65%; five 60% and nine 507; and the rest
reported lower percentages. About two-thirds spend a third or less (mostly Iess) of their
labor relations working hours on NLRA activities.
57. Over 40% of the respondents indicated that 507 or more of the advice they give
is required "immediately." Almost all respondents reported that between 5% to 307, of
such counsel must be rendered within the same working day as the request. Where the
individual's responses to the three categories ("immediatey," "within two hours" and
"within the same working day") cumulated to more than 100%, the answers to the
less inclusive categories were subtracted from the more inclusive; where this did not
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What percentage of the questions on which you counsel requires
advice without the opportunity for research which you consider
sufficient to supply advice that is as reliable as complete research
can make it?
Note that the respondent must make his own assessment. Almost half
(24 out of 50) of the management attorneys answering this question be-
lieved that 50% or more of their advice was not as good as full research
could make it.8 Only a very few (5) were completely confident of the
quality of their counsel, and all but 20% (11 out of 50) had misgivings
about 20% or more of the advice given. While no attempt was made
to break down this response by subject matter on which counsel was
rendered, answers to a preceding question showed that counseling on
NLRA matters is a substantial activity among this group. Of the nine
union lawyers who answered this question, four had such misgivings
about 50% or more of their counseling.
In earlier interviews with both management and union practitioners
who devote full time to labor law (all quite successful and with excellent
reputations), many declared that they were under the gun to supply
substantial amounts of quick advice which resulted in guesswork, not
simply slight uncertainties. Probably the misgivings of questionnaire
respondents are of the same import. If the advice sought really was
required within the time limits imposed by the client, it appears to be
impossible to supply completely reliable legal advice in the actual con-
ditions of labor law practice. Although the questionnaire responses
(except in a few instances) do not make clear the areas of labor practice
where the basis of counseling is shakiest, one can expect that counseling
on NLRA matters has its fair share of dubiety-perhaps more than in
other areas,8 9 given the enormous and inexorable flow of decisional
material.40
The question then becomes, how do labor lawyers keep themselves
informed about the law? Questionnaire responses show that it is the
rare lawyer who reads all of the available decisional matter, which is
itself incomplete because the labor services on which they rely do not
occur, the responses were regarded as reporting the actual percentage for each category.
This means that much-perhaps a majority-of counseling must be done with opportunity
for no or only limited research.
88. One lawyer who set the figure at 100% wrote: I'm not kidding."
39. Lacking similar studies for other specialists, the performance of labor counselors
cannot be assessed on a comparative basis. However, on an absolute basis the labor
specialists' assessment of their own performances, surely not exaggerated by pride In favor
of inadequacy, would seem to necessitate attempts at improvement.
40. In thirty-four years the Board has produced over 170 volumes of decisions, each of
some 1700 pages, containing several hundred decisions. In addition, there are thousands
of court decisions. Each week's labor service reports brings at least dozens of both,
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publish the full text of Board decisions and do not reproduce Trial
Examiner Decisions. About one-third of all respondents (34 of 90) have
access to the Daily Labor Reporter: two-thirds of those (23) use it daily;
the bulk of the rest use it "often" or "sometimes." Most who answered
whether they skim or read it, answered "skim." Almost all use a
weekly labor service (except for the small number with scanty total
labor activity who were not included in these tabulations). Principal
reliance for "keeping up" seems to be placed upon the weekly summaries
of new developments the several services provide. But even these are
not read or even skimmed with complete regularity; quite a few prac-
titioners (about 40%) skip issues. The patterns for keeping abreast of
court opinions on the NLRA are just about the same as those for keep-
ing informed about Board decisions.41 As might be expected, Supreme
Court decisions involving the NLRA command considerable, but not
universal or complete, attention. Of 104 responses, 64 indicated that
all Supreme Court decisions involving the NLRA were either read or,
in a minority of cases, skimmed. No respondent wholly overlooks these
decisions,- but when the Court denies certiorari, few go back to the
court of appeals opinion to refresh their recollection.43
41. About one-fourth (26.7%) read or skimmed most Board decisions as reported in
a weekly service, while 34.6% attended to "some." Of the 73 responses that differentiated
between reading and skimming (quite a few respondents did not differentiate), only six
declared that they read all such reports and another 15 skimmed them. About equal
numbers report reading "most" (I1) or "some" (10), while 13 skim "most" and 17 skim
"some."
42. Total responses exceed the number of respondents because of multiple answers;
some indicated combinations such as "skimmed most" and "read some." The answers
were distributed as follows:
Responses Responses Differentiating Beteen
Reading and Skimming
All: 64 61.54% All: Read 42 77.78%
Skim 12 22.22%
Most: 28 26.92% 54
Most: Read 15 68.18%Some: 12 11.53% Skim 7 31.817,
22
Some: Read 6 66.67%
None: 0 -0- Skim 3 33.33%
lO4 9
43. Responses Responses Differentiating Between
Reading and Skimming
All: 7 7.52% All: Read 1 33.33%
Skim 2 66.66%
Most: 11 11.83% Aost: Read 3 50%
Skim 3 50%
Some: 44 47.31% 6
Some: Read 8 28.57%
None: 31 33.33% Skim 20 71.43%
93 28
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In my pre-questionnaire interviews, several lawyers expressed the
view that they limit their reading because of scarcity of time, not because
they regard the omitted material as irrelevant to their tasks. Some un-
doubtedly make decisions based upon clearly understood priorities, but
most indicated that they read Board and court decisions concerning the
NLRA whenever they have time left over from other non-deferrable
work. Several indicated that when their backlog of unread reporters
gets too large, they forget that batch and start with the current reporter,
hoping, vainly as it turns out, to do a better job of keeping up there-
after.44 Of course, some can consult partners and other associates, but
the respondents' lack of confidence in their counseling indicates that
this does not fill the preparedness gap.
All in all, these activities constitute a valiant effort at "keeping up"
which nonetheless indicates that labor practitioners can be aware at any
moment of only a fraction of the decisional material and commentary
available.45 The considerable misgivings expressed over the reliability
of their advice suggest that the level of preparation on NLRA matters
44. Only a minority of respondents answered the questions indicating the time lapse
since they last read the weekly service issue of Board decisions. Most of them were rea-
sonably current. However, interviewees report the phenomenon described in tile t xt, And
in several oral presentations of the subject, this description has been met with latghis
of recognition followed by cocktail party confirmation that that's the way it is. Indeed,
a stack of unread weekly service reports is an almost standard feature of the labor
lawyer's office.
45. Law reviews do not seem a major source of information to management prac-
titioners about NLRA matters. The Labor Law Journal and the ABA Labor Section's
publications get a fair amount of attention. Practitioners seem to favor a law review In
their own state or region although neither the contents pertaining to the NLRA nor
the law depend upon geography.
Of the 96 respondents the following indicated some use (most did not indicate frequency







Own School's 32 33.33
In state 28 29.16
Other 13 13.54
The Labor Law Journal gets some use from 59 (61.45%) of the respondents, of those
indicating (43), 27 read it and the other 16 skim. The Monthly Labor Review received
some attention from 30 of the 96 (31%) respondents. The Industrial and Labor Relations
Review, respondents report, is used in some fashion by 22 (22.91%) and Industrial Re-
lations by 11 (11.45%).
Annual reports of the American Bar Association Section of Labor Relations Law,
which summarize the preceding year's developments in several areas, including Board
and court decisions under the NLRA, receive the attention of 73 respondents (76.04%).
These publications are now published in August and cover up to the preceding Spring.
Of course, Association members are more likely than non-members to use Section materials.
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is not equal to lawyers' needs-or at least the needs of those counseled.
Put another way, the unrefined case flow is unmanageable."0
It is desirable that labor specialists be more fully informed about au-
thoritative interpretations of the Act. A major way of accomplishing
that end would be to put such material in a form that can be digested
and mastered by practitioners in the time they actually have available
for the task. If the Board's purposes are to be served and if those gov-
erned by the Act are to have a better chance of avoiding conflicts with
it, a better method of communicating what the Act means should be
devised. Rule making may provide a major means of improvement.
III. The Comparative Utility of Adjudication and Rule Making in
NLRB Policy Formulation47
A. The Utility and Limits of Adjudication
Adjudication48 provides an incentive to parties to a dispute to make
as full a presentation as possible of the evidence and arguments in de-
fense of their interests. From the clash of adversary interests, the decision
maker is supposed to become fully informed. Narrow concrete issues are
posed and thoroughly explored; determination of issues beyond those
absolutely necessary for resolution of the immediate dispute is avoided.
46. Even when there is time for research, the job can be formidable and full of
uncertainty. See, for example the comments of Professor Shapiro, who is not readily
daunted by research tasks. Shapiro's Choice, supra note 8, at 94041.
47. No purpose would be served in replowing the ground so expertly tilled by Pro-
fessor David Shapiro, Shapiro's Choice, supra note 3, or Professor Cornelius Peck, Peds's
Atrophy, supra note 3. This section summarizes the salient points of their excellent
articles and adds some observations of my own; however, on one major point-developed
in IV below-I do differ with Professor Shapiro.
The discussion in this section is of rule making under the Administrative Procedure
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (Supp. IV 1969) [hereinafter often referred to as APA; all later
citations to the Code refer to the 1969 supplement]. Its principal characteristics are:
agency announcement, in the Federal Register, of proposed rule making stating the
substance or text of the rule to be considered; opportunity, on notice published in the
Federal Register, to all who desire to do so, to submit comments on the proposal; agency
statement of the rule and its justification; publication in the Federal Register of the
authoritative text in a systematic fashion.
Adjudication, in this text, does not always mean APA adjudication, because repre-
sentation cases are exempt from APA adjudication requirements. However, unfair labor
practice procedures must conform to these requirements. What is meant by adjudication
is a formal hearing on notice to named parties of the matter to be determined, with a
decision to be made based upon the hearing record and served upon the parties whose
conduct or status is affected by it.
48. Although both representation and unfair labor practice proceedings depart from
the civil court adjudicatory model (e.g., administrative officials decide, in the first instance,
whether formal hearings are in order; the General Counsel controls the main presenta-
tion of an unfair labor practice case against the respondent), the essentials of adjudica-
tion as already defined, supra note 47, are present. In the NLRB versions, adjudication
gives greater protection to respondents than to those who seek to initiate proceedings,
whose interests may be disposed of by informal decision. But, once at the hearing stage,
they too get their say.
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How helpful are these several attributes of the adjudicative process
in the formulation of policy which will be applied to future parties
similarly situated and which must fit the realities of labor-management
relations?
The case-by-case approach, of course, enables the agency to consider
issues with care, exploring and testing each piece of new ground before
it proceeds. It also permits adjustments and refinements as criticism
and experience recommend. But the method is largely haphazard.4 1
Issues do not arise in any logical order and the information provided
may come in bits and pieces that do not make the same sense as when
found in the whole. ° Under these circumstances, individual litigants
can hardly be expected to be aware of the larger questions at issue,
nor to be able to muster the data necessary for their full exploration."'
We have been conditioned to the view that case-by-case development
guards against premature generalizationa2 but there is at least an equal
and opposite danger of excessive particularization. A distorted emphasis
upon the dominant factors in particular cases which have been decided
tends to stunt the growth of balanced and flexible doctrine. It is a fact
of legal life that when confronted by a problem in which the law is
uncertain, counsel will attempt to bring his case (through his client's
actions or his own arguments) within the confines of what little doctrine
there is. This tactical approach means that instead of confronting an
expanding panorama of industrial experience as it receives more cases
involving an emerging problem, the Board often confronts a steady
stream of lawyers who seek to persuade it that what has happened is
49. In the case of the NLRB, a measure of control i3 exercised by the General Counsel
who has wide discretion in deciding which unfair labor practice cases to process fornally.
This kind of supervision is absent from the representation area. In both he cannot control
the order in which cases are filed.
50. Professor Fuller calls the solution to such a problem a "polycentric task," that Is,
one in which the parts of the whole are so interrelated that any decision on one part
affects all the others; hence all must be decided in concert. Fuller, Adjudication and the
Rule of Law, in R. FALK & S. M.ENDLOVITZ (ed.), 3 THE STRATEGY OF WORLD ORDtR 410,
442-43 (1966), reprinted from 1960 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN SoCIEr OF INrrtNA-
TIONAL LAW 1.
51. W. GELLUORN & C. BYsE, ADMINisrATivE LAW 725-26 (4th ed., 1960) makes tile
same point very incisively. Some parties use non-expert counsel, and the proceedings
probably suffer.
52. I doubt that the arguments can be more skillfully or elegantly put than in A.
BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 169-183 (1962). While there is much to be said
for the "simmering" process he advocates, one looks mostly in vain for Board decislong
that finally yield the "enduring solution" to which the 'simmering" is the advertised
prelude. Id. at 176. Indeed, I suggest, enduring solutions simply are not to be had In a
society as dynamic as ours. The problems, or at least their manifestations, change too
rapidly for the case-by-case process to keep pace. Rather, the method may institutionalize
a state of permanent indecision. Usually we must determine policy on what we know at
the time a decision is required; even if that knowledge is incomplete, it ought to be as
full as systematic inquiry can make it.
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governed by the Board's smidgen of doctrine. Such a process offers
limited enlightenment on industrial change. Undoubtedly, the case-by-
case method presents some advantages, but one must question whether
it always is the best method for policy formulation, as the Board insists.
At least one commentator has defended the utility of adjudication in
establishing clear standards of general applicability in the area of labor
relations. While advocating greater use of the rule making power, Judge
Friendly lauded the NLRB's achievement in enunciating broad stan-
dards through adjudication.53 It should be observed, however, that he
comes to Board decisions as an appellate judge who tends to see the
Board's products at or near their best, thanks to the advocacy of the
General Counsel's excellent appellate section. Furthermore, he can
generally take whatever time is required to make sense where subtlety
often outweighs directness. Quite apart from his rarified vantage point,
however, Judge Friendly's examples raise a question whether the
Board's performance is as good as he says it is. He applauds the early
cases, for example, which declared the basic NLRB rules concerning
organizational activity on company property.54 The former is a rather
curious example since the Peyton Packing rule was so incomplete and
since, after its initial Supreme Court approval in Republic Aviation,5
attempts to build upon it were bludgeoned by the courts.0  Indeed,
practically every major Board decision in this line failed to extend or
elaborate the original rules concerning organizational activity on com-
pany property. While there is no guarantee that rule making would
have done better, the case-by-case approach can hardly offer a poorer
advertisement.
B. The Utility and Limits of Rule Making
1. Advantages
Both the Administrative Law and Labor Sections of the American
Bar Association have urged rule making upon the Board,57 as have
53. FRIENDLY's AGENcIEs, supra note 3, at 36-52.
54. E.g., Peyton Packing Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 828 (1943).
55. Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
56. Notably, in the order of disapproval, NLRB v. Babcock Wilco&A Co., 351 U.S.
105 (1956); NLRB v. United Steelorkers of America, 357 U.S. 357 (1958); May Dep't
Stores Co. v. NLRB, 316 F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 1963). The cases are reviewied and anal)ed
in Gould, The Question of Union Activity on Company Property, 18 VAND. L. RP. 73
(1964), and Bok, supra note 34; and, for special attention to the earlier cases, see Hanley,
Union Organization on Company Property, 47 GEO. UJ. 266 (1958).
57. Indeed, in 1964 the House of Delegates at the instance of the Administrative Law
Section so resolved. 16 ADMIN. L. Rnv. 77 (1964).
The Labor Section in 1958 prompted the House of Delegates to resolve to urge the
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Judge Friendly, Professors Davis 8 and Peck 9 and some other ac-
ademics.6 0
The principal advantage of rule making is that it provides a clear
articulation of broad agency policy. By contrast, the entire array of
the Board's adjudicatory decisions on a subject often gives a diffuse,
overly subtle mosaic of current NLRB doctrine. Rule making confronts
the agency with the immediate necessity of declaring its policy in full.
Of course, a regulation can be as airtight as Swiss cheese if it is riddled
with terminology like "reasonable, .... where appropriate," or "under
all the circumstances"; on the other hand, it is asking a great deal of
the Board to be decisive where Congress could not make up its mind.
In short, even if we cannot expect perfection, rule making procedures
may exert some salutory pressures toward clarification.
Clearly enunciated and properly drawn rules should reduce litiga-
tion 1 by authoritatively advising the regulated what may, must, or
must not be done. The Administrative Procedure Act requires that the
agency publish its rules62 and make them readily available to all who
are affected by them.63 The huge NLRB staff also must know what Board
policy is; their performance in informal case handling would be im-
proved if they could be more readily certain of their agency rules. Rule
making provides the agency with the opportunity to initiate changes
in its own doctrine, whereas adjudication leaves this initiative to the
Board to "reconsider" its views on rule making in regard to jurisdictional and contract
bar questions. 42 LAB. RyL. REP. 513 (1958).
58. DAvis' TREATISE, supra note 3, § 6.13 (1965 Pocket Part.).
59. Peck's Atrophy, supra note 3.
60. E.g., Professor Shapiro states his belief that "there are instances in which the su-
periority of the rule making route seems plain." Shapiro's Choice, supra note 3, at 942.
61. Concern over case load is not limited to the agencies but extends to the Federal
courts of appeals. In a recent two year period, appeals involving administrative agencies
contributed some 2639 cases of the 15,086 total. NLRB cases accounted for an un-
believable 1207 cases (a number about equal to half the cases decided by the Board
members in the same period). Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals:
The Threat to the Function of Review and the National Law, 82 HARy. L Rzv. 642,
545 (1969). But the courts of appeals decide them at a decidedly slower rate: 244 In
fiscal year 1967. 32 NLRB ANN. REP. 225 (1968). While Prof. Carrngton understandably
concentrates his analysis and proposals upon rationalizing court organization to handle
the case flow, there is a good deal to be said for contraceptive efforts at the agency stage
to prevent overproduction of cases. Rules capable of resolving key issues in large numbers
of potential cases might perform that function.
62. Note, The Federal Register and the Code of Federal Regulations-A Reappraisal,
80 HAv. L. REv. 439 (1966).
63. The Federal Register is not breakfast-time reading for the American public nor
even those with substantial interests affected by federal agency regulation. Lawyers and
dients do not scan it to ferret out new regulations of interest to them. Rather, like the
statutes at large, and session laws, it (along with the permanent version, the Code of
Federal Regulations) is the official and authoritative version and record of agency regf-
ulations. In turn these are disseminated to the interested public through specialized
usable services and journals which organize, publicize, and provide the gist, and some-
times the corpus, of the agency rule.
590
Rule Making and the NLRB
few private parties who have the resources, the hardheadedness, or the
innocence to persevere in the litigation process.
The procedures of rule making have broad utility. In the first in-
stance, the agency must give notice that it is contemplating rule making
and declare the proposed rule or state its substance or subject matter.
This notice, carried by specialized publications to those who are poten-
tially affected, sets in motion the processes of private groups who will
seek to advance their own policy by mobilizing their sources of in-
formation and experience and making them available to the agency.
In a rule making procedure, the Board can call upon the talents of
many parties and lawyers; in adjudication it rarely hears others than
the immediate parties to the case. While many submissions may seem
to duplicate or overlap, each will give the Board some idea of the extent
and nature of the industrial sectors which would be affected by the
proposed rule, and the variety of views expressed will tell the Board
about possible complexities in the rule as well as its interrelationship
with other rules. In rule making, all potentially affected have the oppor-
tunity to shape the initial decision before the agency attitude hardens,
whereas adjudication often burdens non-parties with persuading the
agency to overrule or modify a precedent.
If the agency affords itself the opportunity, the contemplated rule
itself can be the subject of critical comment. Agencies should not be
content with merely general questions. With the possible exception of
a case which must be decided immediately, public discussion of the
actual language of a rule before it is promulgated is always desirable,
even if more than one submission must be made to the affected public.
Dissection and comment by interested parties can focus remedial at-
tention upon provisions whose impact may not be fully appreciated by
the agency. Such a procedure can avoid a full generation of litigation
over ambiguities and inconsistencies.
How Board members allocate their time and talents is a major prob-
lem in the administrative process. Rule making would require them to
focus upon a comparatively few major policy issues rather than spread
their attention thinly over hundreds of litigated cases. Although the
essence of their talent is their informed judgment, it cannot reasonably
be brought to bear on each (nor perhaps any) of the 1200 contested cases
they nominally decide each year. When a major case comes before the
the Board, its members often show a tendency to fasten onto peculiar-
ities of the case in order to justify a new departure. This puts fuzz on
the "rule" which the industrial community needs to guide its actions.
The synthesizing talents of the Board members and their staffs, there-
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fore, would seem best concentrated upon major policy-explicitly con-
sidered as such and from which they cannot hide in the thicket of case
peculiarities.
The question of uniform treatment should be considered briefly. As
Professor Shapiro points out,04 rule making tends to uniform treatment
while adjudication may result in unequal treatment due to unration-
alized fact distinctions. I would observe, however, that the rigors of
rule making uniformity can be ameliorated by interpretation in adjudi-
cation, while the mere existence of a rule will forestall many potential
cases or provide the basis for summary disposition of many others. Pro-
fessor Shapiro also argues that potentially affected parties would more
readily contest rules to which no immediate risk attaches rather than go
to litigation in a concrete case with the potentiality of an adverse
order. 5 Even if this were so, and I am not persuaded that it is, such
challenges need not result in any net delay, since both the agency and
the public can find out early rather than late the validity of the agency's
doctrine.
Moreover, I would add, quite a few employers, employees, and insur-
gent unions are represented by counsel lacking experience in the field.
They require means for ready orientation in a field that lacks a compre-
hensive, up-to-date treatise (it is widely considered to be impossible to
produce such a treatise) if they, adverse parties, and the agency are not
to waste a lot of time, energy, and resources.
One policy area in which rule making is particularly important-
since cease and desist orders after the commission of unlawful acts often
are ineffective-is the area of affirmative duties. Many agencies, espe-
cially those endowed with licensing power, mandate affirmative actions
by the regulated. An agency like the NLRB, however, thinks and acts
primarily in terms of interpreting its statute to define improper activity
or to provide authoritative answers to disputes between parties (e.g.,
what is an appropriate unit for bargaining). On the isolated occasions
when the Board has attempted in adjudicatory proceedings to lay down
requirements of affirmative conduct, it has failed badly.0
Unfair labor practices proceedings have proven of doubtful value in
discouraging the commission of unfair labor practices and undesirable
representation election campaign conduct. Some informed observers
believe that some major abuses to which the statute was directed have
64. Shapiro's Choice, supra note 3, at 935.
65. Id. at 941.
66. E.g., Local 357, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667 (1961).
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never been seriously dented, let alone stopped. The closed shop al-
legedly persists in effect in several industries.07 Employers discriminate
against union adherents with relative impunity, hardly deterred by the
prospect of back pay orders in a near full employment, high profit
economy. Much bargaining is pro forma.
Perhaps these, and other chronic illegalities cannot be eradicated or
even substantially reduced by the Board no matter what it does. How-
ever, rules prescribing affirmative conduct may contribute to ameliora-
tion where the old individual case formula has failed to produce no-
table improvement. Professor Peck stated what many of us already
believed to be the proper approach to minimizing the potentiality for
discrimination in hiring halls: a rule making investigatory hearing cul-
minating in rules setting standards to insure fair treatment of all
applicants for employment. The rules that emerge could hardly help
but be more realistic than those the Board concocted in camera and
they probably would be enforceable.68
Many of the comparative advantages of rule making rather than
adjudication as a means of policy making assume that the Board
will utilize the rule making procedure effectively. If the Board holds a
rule making hearing, for example, but does not carefully study the views
of those who contribute them, the advantage of a variety of viewpoints
is nullified. Similarly, if the Board does not use rule making aggressively
to reduce some of the sources of litigation, the continuing demands of
heavy litigation will prevent the Board from concentrating on major
policy. The settled habits of union and management advocates, the
comparatively weak demand for rule making, and most importantly,
the almost undeviating rejection of rule making by all members of the
Board during its thirty-four years of operation make the potential
effectiveness of a new approach subject to some doubt.
2. Board Objections Stated and Assessed
The Board has criticized rule making as a "cumbersome process of
amending substantive rules that necessarily impedes the law's ability to
respond quickly and accurately to changing industrial practices."C2 As
67. See, J. GOLDBERG, THE AiARITIME STORY (1958); W. HAnER & H. LLImSo., LAmon
RELATIONS AND PRODucrrVY iN THE BuILDIcN TRADES (1956).
68. Peck's Atrophy, supra note 3, at 746-51. One court of appeals suggested the pos-
sible utility of rule making in the hiring hall situation. NLRB v. E & B Brewing Co.,
276 F.2d 594, 598 (6th Cir. 1960).
69. Ervin Hearings, supra note 3, at 1663. For a fairly full authoritative exposition of
the Board view see F. McCulloch, Procedures Employed by the NILRB in Determining
Policy, 1964 PROCEEDMGs, A.B.A. SEcrION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LWv, reprinted in Ervin
Hearings at 1281.
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compared with both representation and unfair labor practices, however,
formal rule making does not appear to be unduly "cumbersome." All
three processes require preliminary staff investigation, notice to parties,
a hearing for the submission of evidence and an opportunity for argu-
ment. Adjudicatory proceedings, moreover, are not very different: while
rule making may involve both oral and written submissions (often only
the latter), written briefs must always be allowed after an adjudicatory
hearing. Routine cases aside, adjudication procedures consume substan-
tial blocks of time. In Excelsior,70 for example, the first election was
held in 1963, the regional director issued his report in January, 1964,
and exceptions were filed soon thereafter. The Board did not formally
take the matter in hand until April 2, 1965, when it ordered oral argu-
ment for May 20, 1965. Its decision issued on February 4, 1966, after
nine and one half months gestation. "Stately" seems the kindest term
to characterize the pace of such adjudication. Rule making could hardly
be less "quick."
Since adjudication and rule making are relatively equal in time con-
sumption, the crucial question in comparing the two is which tends to
induce informal disposition of cases and thus cut down on litigation.
Board actions in the area of jurisdictional criteria and contract bar,
although normally decided in "cases," have resulted in what are tanta-
mount to rules. Experience indicates that the first promulgation of the
jurisdictional criteria reduced litigation on this issue. 71 On the other
hand, adjudications which do not develop clear criteria but stress
doctrinal subtlety and fasten upon fact distinctions, as the Board cases
so often do, probably encourage litigation. To the extent that certainty
and clarity can be achieved by rules, I suggest that litigation will be
discouraged and dismissal and settlement by the Board regional staff
greatly facilitated.
Board members and other high NLRB officials apparently do not feel
that clarity is a problem in NLRA doctrine as developed through the
adjudicatory process. One NLRB regional director asserts that the bulk
of the agency's cases do not involve difficult legal questions so that the
clarification of doctrine, if any, achieved by rule making would yield
little advantage. Like many other senior agency officials, however, this
70. Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966).
71. I am not aware of supporting data on this point because records of Issues ralscd
in proceedings, other than the sections invoked in unfair labor practice cases, are not
published. However, as an attorney in a Board regional office at the time, I can report
that the publication of jurisdictional criteria eliminated most of the litigation on the
subject, which frequently had precipitated time consuming wrangling and proof. There-
after, the issue was the subject of stipulations and routine fact finding, by and large,
Published Board decisions thereafter were not much concerned with the problem.
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director's Board experience spans most of his professional career, every
day of which has been devoted largely to NLRA problems. Even the
most expert private practitioner, who must deal with many other kinds
of problems, cannot match such familiarity. Nor does the practitioner
command the resources available to regional directors. Hence the
familiarity of senior administrative officials with Board lore may lead
to their misperception of the value of clarification and codification to
those subject to the law. Legions of lesser officials who must process
cases do not have the experience of most regional directors, nor are
they generally as talented. These subordinate officials, who process the
major portion of the Board's work, arguably would perform their func-
tions more adequately and rapidly if many of the Board's fragmented
pieces of doctrine squirreled away in innumerable cases, were collected,
organized, and rationalized in rules. Private parties often violate the
law or press spurious positions for tactical purposes (e.g., in attempts
to delay union recognition or to force bargaining concessions), more
certain and speedier disposition of cases by subordinate officials would
reduce the advantages of such tactical maneuvers.
Quite apart from the asserted clarity of adjudicated doctrine, Board
officials claim that the issues before them simply do not lend themselves
to rule making. Board Chairman McCulloch for example argues that
aside from jurisdictional criteria and contract bar rules, little else
on the Board's indigestible menu is subject to rule making. He asks:
is broad rule making really suited to the multitude of variant fact
patterns in which the Board must determine such matters as (a) the
extent and the limits of the duty to bargain in good faith, for in-
stance in reference to subcontracting, plant transfers and shut-
downs; ... (c) under what circumstances employer or employer
association lockouts do not trench on employees' rights; (d) the
degree of deference to be accorded arbitration awards, or the mere
availability of a grievance-arbitration procedure; (e) nice distinc-
tions between primary and secondary union conduct, at plants, or
separate gates, or construction sites, or roving situses; (f) the con-
tent of the bargaining representative's duty of fair representation
and the consequences of its violation; (g) the limits presumptively
appropriate for employers' no-solicitation and no-distribution
rules; (h) the thorny question of alleged representation election
misconduct, or so-called "free-speech"; (i) the voting rules for
economic strikers; (j) the correct construction of new statutory
provisions concerning organizational picketing; hot-cargo contracts
and secondary hand-billing; etc. -2
72. McCufloch, supra note 69, at 1241.
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Some of these may defy rule making. But I wonder. Indeed, the
frequent subtlety and confusion of the case decisions cry out for the
harmonization that rule making could provide. But the Chairman also
declares:
The process of case-by-case adjudication over the past 29 years on
the other hand has achieved a clarification of standards under the
law which some forget. If you will consider the scope and variety
of the provisions of our Act, it is suprising how relatively small is
the area of uncertainty.73
One would suppose that much of this vast area of claimed certainty
could be captured in intelligible rules. On the other hand, if most Board
doctrines cannot be reduced to cogent organized explication, the adjudi-
catory method has been a bust.
The Board's characterization of the rule making process as "inac-
curate" is unclear in itself. Apparently it is not referring to accuracy
in terms of fitting a ruling to the facts of an individual case. But if the
Board is to react "accurately to changing industrial practices," it should
have before it as complete a picture about the nature and details of
the problem as possible rather than the keyhole view afforded by in-
dividual cases.
If deciding case facts against such a large panorama is what the Board
means by "accuracy," the amicus device does not provide adequate ad-
ditional range to the adjudicatory method. Any limitation upon par-
ticipation excludes potentially relevant experience, which in an
economy as vast, complex, and varied as ours, should be known as
completely as possible before an agency promulgates policy. The ad.
versary system depends not only upon rational analysis of a controversy,
but also upon information and arguments which may well be solely
within the knowledge of those affected. Similarly, a rule making re-
quirement assumes that litigants in individual cases do not represent
the full range of possible fact situations and arguments potentially in-
volved in a prospective rule. The agency consults, or is required to con-
sult with, all those sufficiently interested to present their views. Hence
the exclusionary aspect of the Board's amicus procedure (under which it
invites a few eminent non-parties of its selection to participate in oral
argument and present briefs to the Board) may result in failure both to
inform the Board fully and to provide those with substantial interests
with the opportunity to affect agency formulation of the rule. Rule mak.
73. Id. at 1242.
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ing seems a more hospitable and appropriate method of bringing to
bear the enormious accumulated experience of Board regional office
personnel; its very variety may prove useful. In any event, this inval-
uable potential resource has been largely frittered away-another in-
stance of the cost of the Board's attitude that it is essentially a court.
A very different kind of objection to rule making is that it provides
too easy an opportunity for rapid and radical changes of policy. Im-
plicit in this view are two false assumptions: first, that precedent
operates more powerfully in the adjudicatory process than in the
essentially legislative process of rule making;74 and second, that the
adjudicatory process contains a built-in lag which precludes such rapid
policy changes. Those familiar with legislatures know that precedent is
a powerful force in facilitating or retarding change, and is often invoked
both in aid and in opposition to legislative measures.--5 On the other
hand, the power of precedent in agency adjudicatory proceedings can-
not forestall policy changes resulting from major political changes. The
extensive overruling by the "Eisenhower Board" and by the "Kennedy-
Johnson Board" of their predecessors' doctrines make the point0 If
new Board majorities Hlave not staged policy changing orgies, they
certainly have gobbled up precedents with relish.
The Board's generally conservative attitude toward adjudication can
be explained in part by its politically vulnerable status. While other
agencies have received some attention and criticism from Congress
and the bar, the NLRB has been a whipping boy without rival, since
it constantly decides the controversies of powerful groups with tal-
ented counsel, expert publicists, and important political allies. One
may surmise that the Board has reacted by adopting the mechanism
least subject to attack-the decision of individual cases on the narrowest
possible ground, riveted to the factual peculiarities of the particular
74. But see Shapiro's Choice, supra note 3, at 94647.
75. For example, during the 1957 Congressional debates on that year's Civil Rights
Act, the unfortunate experiences of labor organizations at the hands of the federal ju-
diciary prior to the Norris-LaGuardia Act was constantly invoked in opposition to the
use of the federal courts' civil contempt power without jury trial in aid of civil rights.
As one who participated in and observed that legislative struggle as a Senatorial aide,
I offer the conclusion that while some invoked the precedents cynically, others were
sincerely disturbed by them. The net effect was curtailment of the original proposals on
court contempt power, despite majority support for the objectives of tie overall bill.
76. It would be an act of supererogation to rehash yet again the stories of these
developments. Several writers have described them, e.g., Professor Peck in Ervin Hearings,
supra note 3, at 135, 136, 141, 149 (1968). This presentation also was published as Peck,
A Critique of the National Labor Relations Board Performance Policy Formulation:
'Adjudication and Rule Making, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 254, 255-56, 263-64 (1Q963).
E.g., the controversial Breeding Transfer Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 493 (1954), involved revision
of the Board's jurisdictional criteria--essentially a rule making operation in the guise of
adjudication.
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proceeding, and often heavily dependent upon findings of fact sup-
ported (in Trial Examiners' Decisions) by almost stream-of-consciousness
detail. Review of such decisions properly lies with the courts, which,
although not uncritical, have sustained the Board in a high proportion
of cases. Ironically, rule making might have the effect of insulating
Board decisions even more effectively from judicial scrutiny and second-
guessing. On the other hand, the Board apparently is afraid that rule
making decisions would be rendered without elaborate fact-finding,
and would focus explicitly on policy, thus bringing excessive attention
from Congress, the most dangerous branch to bureaucrats.17 Although
such fears are understandable, there is no reason they could not be
allayed if the Board were given adequate resources to accomplish its
fact-finding task. Congress will have to provide funds for staff to do
the job, and the Board will have to cut down the time it devotes
to adjudicatory decisions. It is about time that the Board be put on
a par with other agencies and be effectively empowered to perform
and commission research efforts to probe the realities of the labor-
management world. The fruits of such endeavors, of course, would be
subjected to analysis and comment in the rule making proceedings
before being used for policy making.
While rejecting rule making in principle, the Board is not entirely
frigid to the advantages of rule making. In order to eliminate a sticky
doctrinal problem, the Board has on occasion resorted to what might
be called "rule making by adjudication."78 The Excelsior7 decision
was the result of such an effort.
IV. The Wyman-Gordon Decision and Its Forbear, Excelsior
A. The Excelsior "Rule"
Excelsior represents the latest stop on a long and tortuous path
traveled by the NLRB in its efforts to provide union organizers with
some means of matching employers' ready access to their employees.8 0
77. As Professor Summers has pointed out, some Board members have pretended that
they merely apply the statute, thereby avoiding, or seeking to avoid, criticism directed to
policy. Summers, supra note 9, at 95-98. Judge Friendly suggested, but with a different
purpose, that the proper method of challenging an agency rule Is to seek agency re-
consideration or Congressional reversal. FIUENDLY'S AENcims, supra note 3, at 7.
78. E.g., Breeding Transfer Co., supra note 76.
79. Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966). The Board heard and de-
cided it with K.L Kellog & Sons.
80. That complicated story lies beyond this essay. The essentials are summarized and
analyzed in Gould, The Question of Union Activity on Company Property, 18 VAND, L.
REv. . 3 (1964); and Bok, supra note 34, at 92-106 (1964).
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In Excelsior and its companion case, the employers had mailed anti-
union material to employees prior to a Board election. Thereafter, in
each case, the union requested the employer to provide a list of em-
ployee names and addresses in order to make possible the mailing of
rebuttal material, and the employer refused. Both unions lost the
elections and filed objections which included the mailing list refusal;
in both cases the regional directors recommended against sustaining
that ground. Before ruling on exceptions to these regional directors'
reports, the Board ordered oral argument and gave the parties leave
to file briefs directed to three questions concerning union access to
mailing lists. The Board also invited several non-parties to file amicus
briefs addressed to the questions. One union that had not been invited
also filed a brief, and the Board accepted it.8i
The Board decision announced: "[W]e now establish a requirement
that will be applied in all election cases."82 Thereafter, employers were
to be required to supply, within seven days of the direction of election,
a list of employee names and addresses to the regional director who
would make it available to "all parties." But the requirement was not
applied to the parties before the Board, and the union election losses
were left undisturbed; the effective date of the "rule" was set for thirty
days after the Excelsior decision to insure party knowledge of their
"rights and obligations."183 In subsequent litigation involving the list
issue, the Board generally prevailed until the Wyinan-Gordon case. 4
B. The Wyman-Gordon Case
In a representation hearing the Wyman-Gordon Company contested
the validity of the Excelsior doctrines5 and declined to honor the
regional director's order to produce the name and address list in con-
nection with an election. Nonetheless, the election was held, and "no
union" received a majority of the votes cast. Both the petitioning and
intervening unions filed objections on the ground of non-compliance
with the Excelsior rule. The regional director sustained the objections
and ordered a new election; the Board denied the employer's appeal
81. Letter of Howard LeBaron, Associate Secretary of the NLRB, to the author, dated
July 7, 1969, in response to a query about communications from volunteers.
82. 156 N.L.R.B. at 1239.
83. 156 N.L.R.B. at 1240. The Board decision repeatedly referred to its "new rule."
31 NLRB ANN. REP. 61-3 (1966) also refers to the Board's "rule," as does the 82 NLRB
ANN. REP. 67 (1967).
84. The Board denial of review of the regional dlrectoes decision in that case is un-
reported.
85. Brief for respondent at 3, NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (199).
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on the ground that "it raises no substantial issues." In connection with
the new election, the regional director again directed the company to
supply the Excelsior list"0 and sought a mandatory injunction en-
forcing that order or, in the alternative, enforcement of a Board sub-
poena for the list. The district court enforced the subpoena,1 but the
court of appeals reversed. 8
Naturally enough, by the time the Supreme Court undertook to
decide89 the issues generated by Excelsior, the views of the lower courts
differed.90 But, so did those of the Justices. Hence we must puzzle
our way though a plurality opinion (written by Justice Fortas, joined
by Chief Justice Warren, and Justices Stewart and White), a concur-
rence (by Justice Black, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall) that
regards all but the result from a point 180 degrees away from that
used by the first four Justices, and separate dissents by Justices Douglas
and Harlan that harmonize with each other and, surprisingly enough,
see the basic issue of rule making as the Fortas foursome does.
The Fortas opinion views the major issue as a question of whether
the Board "has discretion to promulgate new rules in adjudicatory
proceedings, without complying with the [rule-making] requirements
of the Adminstrative Procedure Act."9' The answer given is not quite
clear. The opinion condemned what was done in Excelsior because
the Board did not abide by the APA rule-making procedures. Nor was
the substance of the APA requirements satisfied: only a select group
was invited to comment, whereas the APA requires announcement to
all and opportunity for all to comment on a proposed rule; furthermore,
the notice of hearing did not state "the terms and substance of the
rule."92
The opinion rejects the proposition assertedly argued for by the
Solicitor General that the Excelsior rule is "a valid substantive regula-
tion," binding in the later case upon the Wyman-Gordon Company
86. Brief for petitioner at 4, NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969).
87. NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 270 F. Supp. 280 (D. Mass. 1967).
88. Wyman-Gordon Co. v. NLRB, 397 F.2d 394 (1st Cir. 1968).
89. NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969).
90. Four circuits had upheld the Excelsior rule, explicitly approving the procedure
employed. Two other circuits approved the rule but had not passed on the method of
adoption. Id. at 762, n.1.
91. Id. at 764. In all fairness, it should be noted that the government attempted to
finesse this issue.
92. Id. at 764. However section 4(b)(3) of the APA would be satisfied by a "description
of the subjects and issues involved." 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3). In Excelsior the questions oil
which the Board invited comment would seem to meet that requirement.
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because it was promulgated in a valid adjudicatory proceeding. 3 Mr.
Justice Fortas observed that cases adjudicated by agencies "serve as
vehicles for the formulation of agency policies," but, he declared, this
phenomenon falls short of the Solicitor General's suggestion that
"policies announced in adjudication are 'rules' that.., must without
more, be obeyed by the affected public."9 4 He seemed to object par-
ticularly to the fact that in Excelsior the Board did not apply the new
standard to the parties to that proceeding.95
Nonetheless, the plurality opinion held that the order in Wyman-
Gordon to furnish the name and address list was valid and enforceable
because it specifically directed a named party to do so in the particular
adjudicatory proceeding.90 It also declared that given the Board's broad
"discretion to ensure the fair and free choice of bargaining representa-
tives," the company attack on the substance of the rule lacked merit.
Although the Board's procedure was incorrect, the Fortas opinion de-
clared the Excelsior rule enforceable by subpoena because "[t]here is
not the slightest uncertainty as to the outcome of a proceeding before
the Board, whether the Board acted through a rule or an order. It
would be meaningless to remand."97
93. Fortas's characterization may not be a wholly accurate rendering of te Solicitor
General's argument that, according to SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947) [herein-
after referred to as Chenery 11], an administrative agency may, in the exercise of its
discretion, choose either rule making or adjudication in the formulation of "statutory
standards." See pp. 605-607 infra.
94. 594 U.S. at 765-66.
95. Id. at 765.
96. As Mr. Justice Black's concurrence pointed out, the APA exempts NLRB certifica-
tion proceedings from the sections governing adjudications. 5 U.S.C. § 554(a)(6). Hence.
the hearing and decisional procedures in representation cases are not in strict truth
adjudicatory in the APA sense; unfair labor practice proceedings are. The absence of
these safeguards in representation cases of the kind involved in Wyman.Gordon drew no
mention in the Court's decision nor in the briefs.
One would have expected some exploration of the possible relationship between the
APA adjudication exception and the applicability of other APA provisions. An easy
answer is that the absence of a similar exemption from the rule making requirements
argues for their application. This assumes a conscious choice by Congress (really the
drafters). The lack of adjudication safeguards may argue for some part) protections that
only the rule making provisions can supply. On the other hand, the exemption implied
great agency discretion, limited, however, by the National Labor Relations Act provi-
sions governing such proceedings in section 9, 29 U.S.C. § 159. Perhaps the representation
election process is meant to be subject only to the APA requirement that procedural
rules be published.
97. 394 U.S. at 766-67, n.6.
The Excelsior "rule" is quite inadequate and has required supplementation. One
would hope-and I would expect-that a full canvass of views would result in a fuller
expression of the Board's requirements. Mr. Justice Fortas, in my judgment, was quite
wrong that rule making would produce the same product. On the contrary, the Ex-
celsior rule exhibits the partial nature of case-promulgated doctrine. It partakes of the
Board's habit of engaging in a stately intellectual striptease, which never quite makes
full disclosure--the process may be stimulating but it is decidedly unsatisfying.
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The two dissenters endorsed Justice Fortas's view that the APA
commanded rule making in Excelsior. Mr. Justice Douglas stated:
I am willing to assume that, if the Board decided to treat each case
on its special facts and perform its adjudicatory function in the
conventional way, we should have no difficulty in affirming its ac-
tion. The difficulty is that it chose a different course in the Ex-
celsior case and, having done so, it should be bound to follow the
procedures prescribed in the Act .... 98
He endorsed the Harlan view that rule making, not adjudicating,
occurs when an agency makes "a rule to fit future cases .... Excelsior
is designed to fit all cases at all times. It is not particularized to special
facts."9 9 Mr. Justice Harlan emphasized the future operation of tile
"rule" as the touchstone for deciding that rule making is required.
Both dissenters objected that approving enforcement of the subpoena
because Wyman-Gordon had been ordered to produce the list in an
adjudicatory proceeding "trivialized" (in Justice Harlan's phrase) the
APA rule making requirement.' 0
The concurrence by Mr. Justice Black, joined by Justices Brennan
and Marshall, provided the votes for enforcing the Board's order in
Wyman-Gordon but on grounds wholly different from those of the
plurality opinion. According to the concurring opinion, an agency can
in adjudication reach binding precedents which guide future conduct
in much the same way that rules do. Finding nothing in the National
Labor Relations Act or the Administrative Procedure Act to require
the Board to use one method to the exclusion of the other,"0 " the
concurring opinion endorsed the results reached by the adjudicatory
method but rejected the plurality view that if rule making were neces-
sary, it could be dispensed with for the purposes of this case.
Justice Black objected to what he regarded as the plurality opinion's
requirement (seemingly endorsed by Mr. Justice Harlan, I would add)
that adjudication be confined to cases in which any policy enunciated
is applied to the parties to the case decided. This, he argued, requires
98. Id. at 775-76.
99. Id. at 777.
100. Id. at 781-82. Harlan invoked SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943) (11l011111
1), for the proposition that when an agency decides a case on incorrect grounds It is nat
the Court's function to find a proper basis for it. He did not make the Fortas assutmptlon
that a remand would make no difference.
101. Citing Chenery II, supra note 93. As noted at p. 606 infra, the decision did slot
involve the APA.
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the Board to determine before it hears the case whether it will decide
to utilize any new doctrine retrospectively or only prospectively.102
C. What Did Wyman-Gordon Decide?
I. Must the Board Use Rule Making?
As a practical matter Wyman-Gordon may mean no more than that
the Board can continue to make "rules" without rule making and can
compel unwilling parties to comply if it goes through an adjudicatory
proceeding. While that might seem to enable recalcitrant parties to
force the Board to an adjudication in every case, that is precisely what
the statute already provides in both representation 03 and unfair labor
practice 04 cases. Even in the face of rules promulgated under the APA,
a party could insist upon the full hearing procedures. The Board,
however, disposes of the overwhelming bulk of its case load, either by
administrative dismissal, withdrawal (the latter basically a face-saving
device when dismissal is imminent), or settlement. Administrative dis-
missal based upon case precedent, such as the contract bar rules, may
be open to question if not newly adopted through rule making.05
Appeal from such administrative actions ordinarily does not lie. The
wronged party's lack of access to the courts, therefore, may persuade
judges to forbid administrative action based upon case-promulgated
doctrines.'0 6 The inability to dismiss representation petitions adminis-
tratively in a systematic fashion would disrupt the Board's operations,
which already are staggering under a mammoth backlog of cases.
The plurality opinion's conclusion that the Board must use rule
making procedure, but may nonetheless require a party to take action
to satisfy NLRB policy simply by ordering it to do so in a quasi-
adjudicatory proceeding, is intellectually unsatisfying (and was to a
102. This choice would not be made in the first instance by the Board members but
by the General Counsel's delegate in unfair labor practice cases and regional personnel
who in the case of representation proceedings investigate the facts and consider tie
issues and evidence required before deciding how to proceed.
103. 29 US.C. § 159(c)(1) (Section 9(c)(1)).
104. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (Section 10(b)).
105. This possible consequence was first suggested to me by Mr. Burton Kainen, a
second y-ear law student at the University of Connecticut. Conceivably, administrative
determination of unit appropriateness could be open to such attack. Decisions to issue
complaints in unfair labor practice cases would not present like difficulties because of
their discretionary nature.
106. See Leedom v. Kyne, 558 U.S. 184 (1958). In Hotel Employees Local 255 v.
Leedom, 358 U.S. 99 (1958), the Court dealt on the merits with an administrative dis-
missal by a regional director that had been sustained by the Board. The Kyne doctrine
is, however, a very limited one. Railway Clerks v. Non-Contracts Employees, 380 U.S.
650 (1965); Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473 (1964).
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majority of the court). The plurality may have felt that the logical
conclusion of its finding that the Excelsior rule could not be adopted
by adjudication would throw the Board's work into chaos. It may
therefore have designed its holding to prevent the Board from having
to switch suddenly from all adjudication to adjudication and rule
making, but it did not endorse the continuation of adjudication as
the sole method of decision-making. If this is so, the Board's exclusively
adjudicatory approach is living on borrowed time.10 7
Wyman-Gordon suggests that rule making-instead of adjudication
-may be required in some circumstances, but it does not reveal how
the Board is to identify those circumstances. While often desirable,
one need not always understand "why," if one understands "what";108
but both the reasoning and the consequences of Wyman-Gordon are as
unintelligible as they are unclear.109 The fragmentation of the Court
suggests that the Justices divided because the resolution of the rule
making-adjudication rationale remains to be explicated.110 In short,
Wyman-Gordon poses more questions than it answers.
The Court's basic division centers upon the distinction between "ad-
judication" and "rule making" under the Administrative Procedure
Act. The source of the difficulty lies in the circular definitions of
the Act, which declare that adjudication is merely that which is not
107. I emphatically disagree with the conclusion in the Report of the Committee ol
Practice and Procedure under the National Labor Relations Act of the American Bar
Association Section on Labor Relations Law, 1969 SErtioN or LApOR RE.ATIONS LAw 34,
39, that a majority of the Court "upheld the Board's right to utilize the adjudicatory
method . . . in enunciating doctrines of general application." Despite the eminence of
attorneys for both management and unions who apparently endorsed that view, I believe
that the dissenters read the Court more accurately. The Section did not adopt either
view. Since 1965, it has been settled Section practice not to take policy positions unless
endorsed with practical unanimity by the Section and the Section Council; Section Corn.
mittees have no general authority to bind the Section or its Council nor has any such
power been conferred upon the Practice and Procedure Committee.
108. For example, some find faulty the analysis underlying the Court', decision In
Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, 353 U.S. 448 (1957), but the up 3hot of the
decision cannot be mistaken.
109. To me, it seems a way station, like Ass'n of Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 348 U.S,
437 (1955), which also perplexed rather than clarified.
110. Of the Justices sitting then, six held the view that the Excelsior rule required
rule making for its effective promulgation, those joining the plurality opinion (1'ortas,
Warren, Stewart, and White) and the two dissenters (Douglas and Harlan). The three
concurring Justices (Black, Brennan, and Marshall) found adjudication adequate for the
promulgation of the "rule" and the order. The plurality Justices found a specific order
in a specific case an adequate basis for requiring a particular respondent to observe the
rule, but the concurring Justices rejected that formula.
Of the Justices now sitting, four believe that the Excelsior rule required rule making,
but three do not. Among the Justices likely to remain in the Court for any appreciable
time (the odds that Justices Black, Douglas and Harlan will stay on the Court for long
are not good), the division boils down to two and two. These line-ups also argue for
the proposition that Wyman-Gordon, like Alec Guinness' white suit, is spectacular but
unstable.
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rule making. Thus Section 2(7) defines "adjudication" as "agency pro-
cess for the formulation of an order," while Section 2(6) defines "order"
as "the whole or any part of the final disposition... in any matter
other than rule making .... ." That definition might be bearable if
the definition of rule making were clear and sharp. But under Section
2(5) "rule making" means 'agency process for the formulation, amend-
ment, or repeal of a rule," and under Section 2(4) "rule" means
"the whole or any part of any agency statement of general or particular
applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret or
prescribe law or policy" [followed by specific subjects included]."'
Some agency actions, of course, are clearly identifiable as either
rule making or adjudication."' Determining whether a specified in-
dividual, firm or organization has violated a statute or rule the agency
is to enforce calls for "adjudication." The promulgation of standards
to be generally observed requires rule making. Nevertheless, the area
of overlap between the two may be rather broad. Adjudication involves
the "particular applicability" of a law which according to Section 2(c)
is also a characteristic of a "rule." "Adjudication," by virtue of the
precedential value of a decision carries with it "future effect," also
a characteristic of rule making by virtue of a Section 2(c).
While the question of how an agency should deal with the common
ground between rule making and adjudication may present policy is-
sues, it poses no grave legal difficulty if the agency may use either
method. The rub comes if an agency must use one to the exclusion
of the other. Such a mandatory choice assumes that the critical char-
acteristics requiring one course rather than the other exist and can
be discovered. Some members of the Supreme Court in Wyman-Gordon
-indeed a decided majority-apparently believed both that the pro-
cesses are exclusive and can be differentiated. The Court really came
apart with the Justices' attempt to describe the critical factors requiring
rule making rather than adjudication.
2. The Chenery Doctrine
To assess Wyman-Gordon, one must view it against what preceded.
The logical starting place is Chenery II,11 a case which provides at least
111. All in 5 U.S.C. § 551 (emphasis added).
112. Before the Supreme Court's decision in Wyman.Gordon, Professor Peck indicated
his belief that most NLRB policy required rule making, but he noted the occasional
utility of adjudication, for much the same purposes as I suggest in Part V of this article.
Ervin Hearings, supra note 3, 135 ff.
113. SEC v. Chenery Corp., supra note 93. The Supreme Court reviewed a decision
made by the Commission after remand in which it reached the same conclusion as it
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a flickering light. Some of its language and concepts bear on the
rule making-adjudication dichotomy, although the APA did not come
into play in the decision (a point which the Supreme Court did not
mention).
Stripped of many of its perplexities, the Court in Chenery H held
that in an adjudicatory proceeding (it did not use those terms), the
SEC could apply a standard enunciated for the first time in that pro-
ceeding; the absence of a pre-existing rule of general application was
not fatal to the Commission's action. The Court reasoned that the
Commission could not be required to approve improper conduct simply
because it had not already developed a rule to govern it. It laid down
a balancing test for retroactivity: the proper inquiry is whether the
mischief to be prevented is more serious than the ill effects of retro-
activity. While the test is nebulous, the Court did exhibit concern over
applying a standard announced in a proceeding to conduct predating
its enunciation.
Mr. Justice Murphy's opinion for the Court often has been cited
for the proposition that whether to employ rule making or adjudication
is a matter solely within the agency's discretion. 114 While at least one
passage makes no differentiation between the two kinds of proceeding,11
elsewhere the opinion suggests a pattern for choosing between rule
making and adjudication. Mr. Justice Murphy said:
Since the Commission, unlike a court, does have the ability to
make new law prospectively through the exercise of its rule-making
powers, it has less reason to rely upon ad hoc adjudication to
formulate new standards of conduct within the framework of the
Holding Company Act. The function of filling in the interstices
of the Act should be performed, as much as possible., through this
quasi-legislative promulgation of rules to be applied in the fu-
ture.116
had in its first proceeding but on a different basis. I suspect that it is relevant that In
Chenery II the dissenters of Chenery I, supra note 100, provided the majority opinion
and votes and the dissenters came from the majority in Chencry I, The failure to muster
a majority of the court also seems significant. The votes in Chenery I were: four In the
majority, one concurrence in the result, two dissents and two non-participants. Withal,
it has had a powerful influence.
114. "iTjhe choice made between proceeding by general rule or by individual, ad hoc
litigation is one that lies primarily in the informed discretion of the administrative
agency." 332 U.S. at 203.
115. ""The application of ihose criteria, whether in the form of a particular order or
a general regula ion, necessarily requires the use of informed discretion by the Com-
mission." Id. at 208. The observation is quite correct. However, that Is not to say that
the two kinds of proceedings may not involve different doses of discretion or, more im-
pbriantly, differing kinds of in-puts.
116. Id. at 202 (emphasis added).
606
Vol. 79: 571, 1970
Rule Making and the NLRB
Justice Murphy emphasized that rule making may be premature
(for lack of agency foresight or experience) or may never be appropriate
because of the peculiarities of the problem. By endorsing agency pro-
mulgation of a new standard in an adjudicatory proceeding and its ap-
plication in that same case, the Court did not endorse any and all rule
making in adjudication. Read with due recognition of the facts before
the court, Chenery II is not carte blanche to administrative agencies to
use adjudication and rule making as the spirit moves them. On the
contrary, it declares that rule making is the rule, although it permits
simultaneous promulgation and application of a standard in the same
proceeding in dealing with a question of first impression.
S. Differing Views on Rule Making in Wyman-Gordon
A variety of views apparently impelled those Justices who believed
that implementing the Excelsior doctrine required rule making."7-
The plurality opinion posed the issue before it in sweeping terms
in response to the NLRB's brief. The Board's brief in Wyman-Gordon
did not characterize the agency's action as rule making, nor did it
reject the characterization; occasionally it did refer to its "rule."' 18
Rather it emphasized that Chenery I gives an agency discretion to
choose between rule making or ad hoc litigation. Furthermore, it argued
that the APA definitions of rule making and adjudication "are in
general terms and are not mutually exclusive."'10 The Board sought to
sustain this position with courts of appeals decisions upholding its
authority to institute new policies "through decisions in particular cases
rather than by promulgation of formal rules."''2O It wound up this line
of argument with the observation that the Board has "formulated
substantive principles and requirements only through the decisional
process."'12
The plurality replied in equally broad terms: after describing the
117. None of the opinions raises any question that section 6 of the National Labor
Relations Act empowers the Board to make "substantive" rules. Since the Act itself refers
only to "rules," see text of section 6, supra note 3, and since the legislative history is so
scanty, see Peck's Atrophy, supra note 3, at 732-33 n.20, the assumption of substantive
rule making power was--in the language of show biz-a "throv. aay" If and when
the Board undertakes rule making, especially if it establishes affirmative obligations de-
signed to prevent unfair labor practices, the reach of that power iill be sharply disputed.
118. Eg., Brief for petitioner at 22-3.
119. Id. at 11.
120. One example tited, NLRB v. A.P.W. Products Co., 816 F.2d 899 (2d Cir. 1963),
adopted a new policy on the computation of back pay in unfair labor practice case
While the agency presumably has considerable experience with the subject, I would say
that the adoption of such a policy should be preceded by wide ranging consultation and
fact finding about the potential impact of the policy being changed.
121. Brief for petitioner at 14.
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ways in which it believed the Board failed to observe both the letter
and substance of the APA rule making provisions, the opinion became
a bit confusing:
There is no question that, in an adjudicatory hearing, the Board
could validly decide the issue whether the employer must furnish
a list of employees to the union. But that is not what the Board
did in Excelsior. The Board did not even apply the rule it made
to the parties in the adjudicatory proceedings, the only entities
that could properly be subject to the order in that case. Instead,
the Board purported to make a rule: i.e., to exercise its quasi-legis-
lative power. 122
Does that mean that the agency may make the same rule-like deter-
mination if it applies to the respondent in an individual case? It would
seem so, but does it also imply that such a conclusion would have to
be based upon the record facts of that case? The plurality ambiguously
declared:
Adjudicated cases may and do, of course, serve as vehicles for
the formulation of agency policies, which are applied and an-
nounced therein. They generally provide a guide to action that
the agency may be expected to take in future cases. Subject to
the qualified role of stare decisis in the administrative process,
they may serve as precedents. 123
What does all that add up to? I would say that the plurality rejected
the Board's broad proposition. While stressing their common charac-
teristics, it did declare that rule making and adjudication are mutually
exclusive, but without providing a guide as to what factors impel the
choice of one rather than the other.
The two dissents, while they endorse one another, differ on when
rule making is required. Justice Douglas was "willing to assume" that
if the Board adjudicated "in the conventional way" [in Excelsior?]
there would be "no difficulty in affirming its action" [in Wyman.Gor-
don?].124 Again, the opinion seems to say that rule making requires
observance of APA rule making procedure, but it is less than clear
whether he believes that the two procedures are mutually exclusive.
No sure guide emerges from the Douglas dissent as to what situations
require APA rule making procedures.
Justice Harlan emphasized the definition of a rule in the Act as
"'an agency statement of general or particular applicability and future
122. 394 U.S. at 765.
123. Id. at 765-66.
124. Id. at 755-76.
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effect.' "125 He seems to regard the fact that the Board announced that
its new policy would not be applied for thirty days-the period of
delay normally employed in APA rule making-as clinching the rule
characterization. He declared that such prospective effect is required
when the new policy represents a substantial departure from previous
understandings and that it would be "unfair to impose the rule upon
the parties in pending matters."1 20 That is the sort of situation, he
contended, for which rule making was meant.
Harlan seems to imply that where private parties act in reliance on
agency policy, any change should take effect only in the future because
of past reliance. That reasoning does not square with Chenery I1
(which may not be fatal, of course) because one arguably may rely
upon the absence of an agency declaration. More importantly, the rea-
soning is not very helpful. In Excelsior what element of reliance was
there?'--7 -simply a refusal to supply the list in a pending case. If the
employer incorrectly relied on his supposed "right" not to furnish
the list, he was not severely harmed by an order to produce it. Pro-
viding the list is not burdensome. Nor would the employer be pun-
ished if an election were held; a new election would be held solely
for the purpose of vindicating the employees' rights.
Perhaps, these fragments add up to a decision that when, and only
when, the Board does not apply a new policy to the parties before it,
rule making is required. But the Board argued for a broad endorse-
ment of its policy making exclusively through adjudication; the plural-
ity of four and two dissenters refused that endorsement. The fact that
in Excelsior the Board attempted to promulgate a requirement for
the future only seems to have provided extra nails in the coffin of
adjudicatory policy making. (If the defect in Excelsior was only that
the new rule would not apply to the parties, the reliance argument
would be of no avail in later cases-which is a commentary upon the
insubstantiality of both that analysis of Excelsior and the reliance rea-
soning in Wyman-Gordon.)
A newly constituted court, faced with the unresolved problems of
125. Id..at 780 (emphasis supplied).
126. Id. at 781.
127. The Board opinion said that the 30-day delay was only "to insure that all
parties to forthcoming representation elections are fully aware of their rights and obliga-
tions. 156 N.L.R.B. at 1240 n.5. The Board's brief to the Supreme Court said that
delay and prospectivity insure frness when the rules of the game are dianged. Brief at
22-23. It was arguing, however, that prospectivity is permissible in adjudication.
In Excelsior, I suspect that the Board's administrative convenience may have been a
major factor in deferring the effect date. Professor Peck shares that view. Peck, A
Critique of the National Labor Relations Board's Performance in Policy Formulation:
Adjudication and Rule Making, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 254. 274 (1968).
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Wyman-Gordon, conceivably could retreat to the narrower ground
that rule making is required only when the new policy does not apply
to the parties before the Board. Such a view seizes upon what frequently
will be an unessential factor. Often a policy will be made prospective
to enable the agency to prepare itself to cope with it. Reliance may
seem to be a factor, but it sometimes is illusory-as in Excelsior-par-
ticularly in representation cases. However, if there is no essential differ-
ence between rule making and adjudication, then one formal distinction
will serve as well as another, The game will be played as a game and not
because it makes a difference.
But, I suggest, rule making and adjudication differ in important and
identifiable ways.
V. Distinguishing Rule Making From Adjudication
A. Past Efforts and the APA
One might say, with Judge Friendly, that defining the differences
between rule making and adjudication defies comprehension and ex-
pression. 2 This may appeal as the counsel of prudence and wisdom,
but if Wyman-Gordon does anything more than bind the NLRB to
APA rule making procedures when the agency believes it is making a
rule, or is launching a generally applicable policy that it does not wish
to impose upon the parties before it in an adjudicatory proceeding,
then the differentiation must be attempted. That Wyman-Gordon goes
beyond Chenery 1I is evident from the Supreme Court's indication in
Wyman-Gordon that there are recognizable situations requiring rule
making, where substitutes will not be accepted. Either the Supreme
Court must repent, or say it never said so, or we must come up with
a formula that tells when policy making can be carried out only by
rule making.
Several attempts have been made to articulate the critical differences.
While some, particularly those of Professor Fuchs, seem cogent and have
received approbation, they do not unlock the APA dilemma apparent
in a group of federal court decisions which fail to provide any sure
guide to choice. 29
128. FRIENDLY's AGENCIES, supra note 3, at 8-11. A jurist not noted for his obtusenegg,
he declared: "[Afly own litmus paper is not sensitive enough for me to do the job." Id.
at 8.
129. Their inconclusiveness is made quite clear in 1 DAvis' TRATIsE, supra note 8,
§§ 5.01, 5.02 and id., § 5.01 (1965 Pocket Part). No purpose would be served by duplicating
that effort here.
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One attempted generalization is that rule making "operates as to
the future whereas other mandatory governmental acts affect present
or past situations."'130 That test quickly breaks down because so much
of the adjudicatory process, especially administrative remedial orders,
deals with future conduct and not only applies but also makes law which
is prospective.131 The test fails utterly in regard to Board representation
cases (such as Excelsior and Wyman-Gordon) because their sole purpose
is to determine whether in the future any union will be the bargaining
representative of a group of employees and, if so, which union. In the
process, the Board, or its delegate, the Regional Director, decides such
non-judicial questions as the appropriateness of proposed bargaining
units, the extent of common interests of different groups of employees,
what constitutes a timely representation petition-issues which may
involve past conduct but often do not. After the election, the Board
may pass upon objections to the conduct of the election or conduct
affecting the election, which requires primarily fact finding. But the
purpose is not to assess blame or culpability but rather to determine
whether the election results fairly reflect the uncoerced will of the
employees. The decision that follows looks entirely to the future-
the status of the union. Staunch precedent declares that the representa-
tion proceeding is not adversary and the result is not an order.13 All
of which fits the exemption of representation proceedings from the
adjudication provisions of the APA.
Nor does it help greatly to suggest that if fact finding about par-
ticular transactions predominates, the proceeding is or should be
adjudication, but if policy making dominates, then rule making is
or should be employed. In the first place, the comparison is between
apples and oranges, and the fiction of assigning weights is so subjective
that it might obscure the judgmental factor as to which procedure
might be preferred for other more palpable reasons. Such a test, for
example, might require rule making when prudence would recommend
proceeding by small increments in dealing with certain emerging prob-
lems whose future cause and characteristics could not easily be antic-
ipated. That is what Cheneiy 11 was about.
Professor Shapiro makes a different suggestion:
180. Fuchs, Procedure in Administrative Rule Making, 52 Hnv. L. Rr. 259. 260
(1938). [hereinafter cited as Fuchs' Procedure.] This was not Professor Fuchs' proposition,
but one deriving from Supreme Court decisions and commentaries.
131. Id. at 261-62.
132. A.F. of L. v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401 (1940). The exception provided by Lecdom v.
Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958). has proved to be a narrow one, Supra note 106.
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"[R]ulemaking"-the process leading to the issuance of regulations
-is typically a proceeding that is entirely open ended in form,
specifying only the class of persons or practices that will come
within its scope, while "adjudication" is a proceeding directed at
least in part at determining the legal status of persons who are
named as parties, or of the acts or practices of those persons. Such
an approach may be unsatisfactory in many contexts, for by stress-
ing one factor to the exclusion of others it leaves some of the hardest
questions unresolved, may occasionally be inaccurate, and may
permit some formal agency actions to escape identification entirely.
But our interest is primarily with the typical case, and thus an
illustration may well be as useful as an abstract definition; indeed,
it may be appropriate to quote Mr. Justice Stewart's recent answer
to his own question whether hard-core pornography could be ade-
quately defined: "[P]erhaps I could never succeed in intelligently
doing so. But I know it when I see it .... -13
In addition to Professor Shapiro's own caveats, this analysis is open to
the same objection as the "dominant" element approach-the unit of
measure is so utterly subjective as to lack utility. And, in this context,
I really do not know what is meant by "the typical case." It could not
be the type which is settled daily by the Board, for there the necessity
of classifying does not arise; nor does the run of the mill representation
or unfair labor practice case which turns on its own facts present any
problem. The issue of classification arises only when a case requires
both fact finding concerning the parties and the enunciation of a stan-
dard which has applicability beyond that single case. Under these cir-
cumstances, the truffle-snuffing, "I know it when I see it" approach
leaves much to be desired. What is the critical scent? The inability of
courts to articulate a pornography standard has led to an almost com-
plete judicial abandonment of attemtps to deal with such a "standard."
Professor Davis provides a non-guide in his non-rule:
Often the best solution of the problem of classifying borderline
activities is to avoid classifying them-to skip the labelling and to
proceed directly to the problem at hand. Thus, if the problem is to
determine appropriate procedure for a particular activity, the
practical procedural needs may be studied without calling the
activity either rule making or something else; usually nothing will
be lost if the activity is regarded as borderline or mixed or unclassi-
fiable.13 4
133. Shapiro's Choice, supra note 3, at 924-25. Mr. Justice Stewart's remark was made
in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (concurring opinion). I rather prefer my own
version: "I may not be able to define pornography, but I know what I like,"
134. 1 DAvis' TREATISE, supra note 3, § 5.01, 286. In all fairness that is not all he sug-
gests. He fully discusses the hybrid qualities of many situations. He did not foresee nor
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He does, however, endorse the utility of Professor Fuchs' conclusion that
[i]t is feasible to distinguish a general regulation from an order of
specific application on the basis of the manner in which the parties
subject to it are designated. If they are named, or if they are in
effect identified by their relation to a piece of property or trans-
action or institution which is specified, the order is one of specific
application. If they are not named, but the order applies to a
designated class of persons or situations, the order is a general
regulation or a rule.135
The Fuchs test helps to identify what an agency has done, but does not
help to select one procedure or the other before the initiation of a pro-
ceeding, which Wyman-Gordon apparently requires an agency to do.
Wyman-Gordon seems to require, at the least, that the agency know at
the outset whether it will issue an order of individual or general ap-
plicability. Of course, the agency could change during a proceeding if
it became apparent that the procedure selected was inappropriate. Such
an arrangement might not be very speedy, but the delays occasioned by
the requisite notice and hearing seem minimal in comparison with cur-
rent Board practice.
The APA apparently did not adopt the Fuchs general versus specific
application test, rather it contemplated that a rule may be either of
"'general or particular applicability."'. 36 Does the legislative history
help? An analogy appears in several places: rule making is like what
the legislature does, while adjudication is like what the courts do.13T
But that only gets us back to where we started-the recognition that
case precedent and policy enunciated in case decisions have general
applicability to non-parties in the future. The Final Report of the
Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure em-
phasized that rules, "like statutes, are addressed to people generally."'u a
Similarly it explained that setting rates and price fiixing (which in-
volve only one or a few named parties) constitute rule making because
advocate the mandatory, exclusive approach employed by the Wyman.Gordon plurality
and dissenters. Neither did Professor Shapiro. They both took Chencry 11 to mean that
the agency could choose the method it preferred, a reasonable and widely shared in-
terpretation, although caution should have been exercised in view of the fact that the
APA was not involved.
135. Fuchs' Procedure, supra note 130, at 264.
136. APA § 1, 5 U.S.C. § 1001(c) (1964).
137. Eg., 79 CoNG. RFc. 5754 (May 24, 1946) (remarks of Representative Walter),
quoted in Ginnane, "Rule Making," "Adjudication" and Exemptions Under the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act, 95 U. PA. L. REv. 621 at 627, n.16 (1947). [hereinafter cited
as Ginnane's "Ruling Making.']
138. U.S. ATORNEy GENERA.'s CosswTEE o. ADMINI'TRATIVE PROCEDURE. FINAL RErowr
at 12 (1941).
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they affect "great numbers"1 39 who are not immediate parties to the
proceeding. 140
The Committee's draft bill drew the distinction on the same lines;
it did not define either rule, rule making, or adjudication, but did
except from adjudication requirements "proceedings which precede
the issuance of a rule, regulation or order involving the future gov-
ernance or control of persons not required by law to be parties to the
proceedings."' 14 The Senate Judiciary Committee Print of June 1, 1945,
which formed the basis of the ultimate enactment, provided definitions
of these terms somewhat like those in the final measure. The Print
Commentary emphasized the importance of differentiating between rule
making and adjudication because the prescribed procedure "differs...
in essential respects."' 42 It explained that in the definition of adjudica-
tion "the words 'other than rule making' serve to make the essential
distinction." The Print Commentary rejected the suggestion that "sub-
stantive rules" required to be published by Section 3 included "'sub.
stantive criteria' whereby cases are decided.'1 43 In doing this, of course,
it implied that substantive criteria (other than rules) would affect case
decisions. This argues for the establishment of criteria of general ap-
plicability in case decisions.
At the time the Print was written, the definition of rule did not
include the words, "or particular," after the words, "general applica-
bility," nor did it include the words, "and future effect." I" Under-
standing how these terms came into the measure decreases some of the
difficulties in puzzling out just what rule making is. The words "par-
ticular applicability" refer to some of the specific activities, such as
rate making, which frequently involve one or only a few named par-
ties. 48 When seen as keyed to specified activities, "particular" ceases to
complicate the definition of rule (and hence rule making), which can
then be regarded as primarily concerned with matters of general ap.
plicability. The Congressional committees' attention to clarifying the
status of rate making and wage and price setting as rule making also
may explain the addition of the terms, "and future effect," and the re-
139. Id. at 107.
140. Id. at 54.
141. Id. at 196, § 301(c).
142. SEN. CON01. ON THE JUDICIARY, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AGr-LEGISLATIV9 HIS-
TORY, S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 14 (1946).
143. Id., 16.
144. In its enacted form the definition in section 2 reads: "..ule means the whole or
part of an agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect de-
signed to implement, interpret or prescribe law ....
145. Ginnane's "Rule Making," supra note 137, at 625-26.
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sultant emphasis upon that aspect of rule making. Many aspects of adju-
dication, however, have future effect, so as a differentiating factor the
addition is not much help. Moreover, if futurity is regarded as primarily
characteristic of a specified kind of rule making rather than rule making
in general, "general applicability," as in the Fuchs formula, would again
become the guiding characteristic of rule making. If future effect were
thus considered one aspect rather than the sole characteristic of general
rule making, rules might be applied to past conduct, which probably
would be at odds with policy underlying APA in regard to substantive
rules. On the other hand, this could be a recognition that procedural
rules, which are exempted from formal rule making requirements, can
be applied retrospectively. By this point, however, the analysis is en-
tirely speculative and places undue emphasis upon abstractions.
Unfortunately, the legislative history of the particular language in
question provides no net gain. My conclusion is that the terminology
remains part of the problem rather than providing help toward a
solution. The legislative history appears to demonstrate that while
many changes in APA drafts attempted to distinguish between rule
making and adjudication, Congress simply did not resolve the difficulties
posed by the substantial area of overlap between the two. Agencies were
expected to decide policy issues of future significance to non-parties in
adjudication, but rules of general applicability and future effect were
to be formulated in rule making (even if the parties to the proceeding
were named and few in number). The terms used to define the two
simply do not provide the means for distinguishing one from the other.
A more rewarding exercise, I suggest, is to clarify the purposes of
the differing procedures,'140 and then to seek a way of promoting these
goals, a method not only consistent with, but rooted in, the statute.
B. A Proposed Analysis Emphasizing Information Gathering and
Communication
Administrative agencies were established at a time when the courts
were widely regarded as unable to formulate new policy and discharge
regulatory functions because of judicial attitudes toward social change,
the episodic exposure of the courts to empirical data, and the lack of
technical expertise of most judges. 47 The latter two considerations
146. A description of the detailed differences can be found in Rutledge, The Distinc-
tion Between a Rule and an Order in the Administrative Procedure Act, 6 Mvax L.Q.
359 (1952).
147. J. LANDis, THE AiDmmessnATmtV Pocmss 33-34 (1938). On the first point, be quotes
A. DicEr, LAw AND OPImoN i ENGLAN 369 (2d ed. 1926): "if a statute . . .is apt to
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relate directly to the limited means courts have of informing themselves
about facts pertinent to making policy. Perhaps, then, the most pertinent
factor about an administrative agency as compared with a court is the
various and potentially more effective means it has for gathering and
disseminating information bearing on policy.
How the agency informs itself and informs its constituency are pre-
cisely the ways in which rule making and adjudication differ most sig-
nificantly. I suggest that these are the key factors in deciding which set
of procedures should be employed. The first questions should be: given
the nature of the problem, what means will better assure adequate in-
formation upon which to base an agency decision, and what is the
better way to insure participation in decision making by those poten.
tially affected by the proposed policy? These are the elements that
Justice Fortas' Wyman-Gordon opinion fastens upon in describing the
reasons for rulemaking procedures: "mature consideration of [the]
rule" and "fairness. '148
The scope of the agency's knowledge should determine the breadth
of its administrative decision. To the extent that an agency possesses
sufficient knowledge,149 I suggest that it should be free to make policy
in a proceeding directly involving only one or a few named parties,
despite the fact that the decision may create precedent affecting many
others in like situations in the future. Where the agency's knowledge
does not provide a sufficient basis for making policy affecting others
whose interests are not adequately represented by the parties, the
agency must resort to other means of informing itself. Where the infor-
mation required can be gathered only from the larger public subject to
the agency, then only the rule making procedure will suffice. In such a
scheme, the choice between rule making and adjudication would de.
pend upon the method which the agency should use to inform itself
reproduce the public opinion not so much of today as yesterday, judge-made la oc,
casionally represents the opinion of the day before yesterday." LANDIS, supra, at 97. Thejudiciary and attitudes toward it change so much that the earlier views about It may be
forgotten and must be recalled in re-creating the original purposes of American ad-
ministrative agencies.
148. 394 U.S. at 764.
149. Some regard expertise as knowing the right answer almost intuitively. In this
view, expert quasi-judicial officials are exposed to the facts of a case, judge their sig-
nificance based upon their own experience in the field, reach a conclusion that fits a
grand design and fashion a remedy. But I suggest that agency expertise means the ability
to recognize and formulate issues as they emerge from changing circumstances or perhaps
even to anticipate them, sensing what data would be pertinent to their possible resolu-
tion, assessing the design of research that might be expected to yield relevant information,
and weighing the reliability of evidence offered---especially where the source Is partisan.
Expertise, then, does not mean knowing the answers but knowing how to get from
the problem to the possible answers. Expertise implies a heavy dose of social science
method liberally seasoned with experience and practicality.
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in deciding a particular issue or cluster of issues. The initial choice
would turn upon a consideration of the data the agency needed for an
informed decision on a specific subject, given the state of its knowledge
and the amount of testimony that could be expected from litigants
preoccupied with their own immediate problem. Choice is necessary,
however, only when rule making and adjudication both might be em-
ployed. As suggested by Chenery 1I and Ginnane,10 whenever policy is
made, rule making should be the rule and adjudication the exception.
The breadth of an agency ruling should depend on the level of par-
ticipation in the rule making process by those affected by it. An under-
lying premise in the APA is that an agency should consult those whom
it regulates, since the latter often possess information, experience and
expertise pertinent to wisely constructed rules.'0 ' It is often argued
that the Board's amicus procedure affords the same kind of participation
as formal rule making, but the Fortas opinion roundly criticized the
method as inadequate to APA standards.1 2 Distilling experience into
expertise and channelling it to those few officials who make decisions
are critical aspects of administrative organization and procedure. How
can the Board get that experience before it? Justice Fortas suggested
that the invitation be open to all, not just a selected few. Do limited
invitations make a real difference in view of the special qualifications
of those invited? I suggest that they do. In Excelsior, for example, the
Retail Clerks' International Association was not invited, but submitted
a brief'53 which discussed the questions put by the Board as they bore
upon the special problems of labor organizing in retailing. It was a good
brief that presented views not contained in the AFL-CIO brief. One
other serious omission was the General Counsel, who participates in
unfair labor practice proceedings, but not in representation cases. Ex-
pertise does not mean simply the resources of the Board members,
but also that of the constituent elements of the agency, including its
field staff.
The approach suggested would preserve adjudication where it is
150. Ginnane's "Rule Making," supra note 137, at 623. Ginnane was an author of the
ArroaNEY GxNELA's MA1NUAL ON THE AD.wnISTRATiVE PRoCEDuRE Acr (1947). which makes
much the same point at 13.
151. One may ask why the legislature requires procedures it does not exact of itself
in promulgating policy rules to deal with social problems. A partial answer is that the
legislative proponents of any controversial measure are under heavy pressure to observe
similar procedures. In addition, members of the legislature are subject to fairly direct
reprisal, to which administrators are not. Nor can it be said that legislative performance
in the realm of procedure is thoroughly satisfactory.
152. 594 U.S. at 764-65.
153. Letter from Howard LeBaron, Associate Executive Secretary of the Board, to the
author, July 7, 1969.
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clearly preferable as a tool of policy making, since the case.by-case
method serves as a means of tentative exploration of new problems
whose dimensions are not yet clear. Furthermore, an agency can encour-
age parties to call to its attention their experience under and variations
from decided cases by announcing that the policy of a particular de-
cision will be tentative. In such a situation hearings are probing and
any policy, experimental. Indeed, it should be experimental in the
scientific sense-a formula devised to test a thesis which is monitored
in operation.
(An example of a set of problems whose solution could be found best
through adjudication is presented by the cases precipitated by the 010
expulsion of certain unions for their subservience to Communist influ.
ence and the CIO unions' later attempts to capture the exiles' bargain-
ing units. Many of the problems involved in the resulting representation
contests could not be anticipated, so the Board developed its schism
rulings with caution, and as decisions issued, new developments took
place, stimulated in part by the decisions themselves. The Board could
not quickly assess the problem in all of its complexity; even after the
decisions issued, it was difficult to know their full impact upon those
affected. Much of that knowledge resided with regional administrative
personnel and the parties themselves. Rule making proceedings would
then have been in order to provide the Board with full information for
formulating a cohesive set of rules to deal with similar future cases.)
Generally, a rule will be a more compact, readily found, more easily
mastered presentation than doctrine developed in scattered cases. How-
ever, where doctrine is expected to be but partially formed, these ad.
vantages of a rule will not be present in full force.
In an agency system of information gathering and communication,
therefore, rule making will predominate over adjudication in the for-
mulation of policy because it affords greater opportunity for data col-
lection (and the clear enunciation of policy for ready transmittal to
the affected public). Adjudication, on the other hand, will serve two
vital functions in the system: first, as a means of experimenting with
tentative policy solutions; and second, as a way of infusing some flex-
ibility into promulgated rules.
C. Applying APA Rule Requirements-The Roles of the Agency and
the Courts
Who should decide when rule making or adjudication ought to be
employed? While a great deal of initiative lies with the agency, private
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parties also have a statutory right to make requests for rule making.15
In the case of the Board, the General Counsel controls the early stages
of unfair labor practice proceedings and can exercise considerable con-
trol over representation cases.21  He should therefore make the first
agency decision between rule making and adjudication because, in all
classes of cases, his representatives conduct the investigation. The Gen-
eral Counsel's office is equipped to assess whether decision of the case
might significantly affect non-parties and whether the parties to the
adjudicatory proceeding will adduce the data required for a fully in-
formed decision by the Board. A request by the General Counsel to
the Board to undertake formal rule making on questions he propounds,
therefore, would obviously carry great weight.150 Furthermore, if the
Board denies his requests and an adjudicatory proceeding ensues, a
reviewing court would be likely, in the light of Wyman-Gordon, to
accept the General Counsel's view that rule making should have been
employed. Of course, the General Counsel may not seek rule making
and the Board may have to make the decision on its own after it re-
ceives the case on appeal. At that juncture, considerations of inertia and
economy would favor completion of the proceeding in the adjudicatory
mode, especially since launching a rule making proceeding to consider
the policy issue would cause delay in the decision of the particular
case. The best way for the Board to deal with this problem of inertia or
reacting to the General Counsel's decision is to anticipate policy issues
in a constant rule making process. Where a party raises an unantici-
pated or unresolved issue, as was the case in Excelsior, he could be told
to wait for the policy decision which would be made in a separate rule
making procedure. The agency could proceed in two ways: it could
postpone a decision in the case until it decided the policy issue; or it
could decide the case on the basis of a tentative view of the policy issue,
restricting it to that case while launching a rule making proceeding for
the formulation of a rule to be applied in future cases. The latter
154. APA § 4(e) provides: "Each agency shall give an interested person the right to
petition for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule.'
155. NLRB Regulations provide that the General Counsel may have repreentaton
cases transferred to him and may exercise the authority of regional directors in processing
them. 29 C.F.R. § 102.72 (1969).
I do not suggest that the General Counsel should embargo unfair labor practice cases
going to the Board or that he should take jurisdiction over representation cases in order
to "persuade" the Board that it should proceed with rule making when he requests it.
I merely observe that he could take these actions.
156. In other agencies without an "independent" General Counsel, the initiative for
inaugurating proceedings nonetheless resides in that official. This anal)is will hold for
many agencies with both rule making and adjudicative functions.
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course should probably be pursued only if there is urgency to decide
the particular case. On the other hand, a tentative policy actually ap-
plied in a case might provide experience of utility in the further con-
sideration of a rule.
Were the Board to adopt this means of developing rules-and thus
to engage in considerable rule making-one could reasonably expect
the courts to give substantial weight to its choice of adjudication as ade-
quate or necessary to the case at hand and fair to those potentially af-
fected. The Board could defend its choice where the decision interpreted
a rule, the policy issue was of slight potential impact, or the problem
seemed to require initial exploration by the case method. Admittedly,
upon review the courts could effectively assess only extreme situations
and their supervisory role would be minimal.
What is the alternative? Although Wyman-Gordon does not specif-
ically compel the Board to employ rule making, a Supreme Court
majority felt that it was bound to use rule making procedures in
formulating policy. If the Board fails to abide by this determination it
will invite a chaotic situation in which the courts might choose to
invalidate orders involving policy because they were not formulated in
rule making proceedings.
VI. Conclusion-Experimenting with Rule Making
Although it has been decided, albeit with something less than clarity,
that the APA requires the Board to use rule making, the prospects of
spontaneous compliance are not very bright. The almost undeviating
rejection of rule making by members of the Board during its thirty-four
years of operation, the settled habits of union and management advo-
cates, and the comparatively weak demand for rule making, all raise
the question of whether it is desirable, let alone feasible, to expect the
Board to shift its operation from adjudicating to large scale rule making.
While I believe that rule making is eminently desirable, the conclusion
that it should be used in this field is based primarily on supposition. It
may not fulfill its theoretical promise in the field of labor regulation
because too many forces work against it, such as the Board itself, pres-
sures external to the Board, and the inability of Congress to resolve
major policy issues.
Perhaps only legislation can ultimately fit the APA requirements to
the peculiar situation of the NLRB, which has reached thousands of
decisions but promulgated no rules. 57 Meanwhile, I propose a two-year
157. The superstitious may see confirmation of the observations that labor-manage.
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moratorium on APA rule-making requirements, during which the
Board and its special public canvass their alternatives and seek suitable
adjustments. It behooves the Board and the labor-management com-
munity earnestly to seek a negotiated peace that is principled enough
to be understood and applied, yet acceptable to the institutional needs
of all concerned. If labor and management divide on ideological lines,
as so often has happened,5 s and the Board members cling to their own
dead past, all will deserve what they get. The Board, working under
the temporary umbrella of Wyman-Gordon, has the initiative; it could
move toward an amicable and balanced solution by soliciting the views
of all who might be affected by its policies as to how it should ac-
complish its new rule making task.
A general strategy for rule making can be devised in the light of
Wyman-Gordon. First, the Board must develop a general idea of the
subjects to be covered by rules. Several areas of Board doctrine are rea-
sonably well settled, e.g., the rules on the wearing of union insignia on
the job. After receiving comments from the labor-management commu-
nity,159 the Board should announce the subject on which it uil proceed
to make rules. It should consider "subcontracting" a substantial por-
tion of the initial task to seminar groups in law schools, business
schools, and schools of industrial relations which might make pre-
liminary drafts based upon Board decisions in simulated rule making
proceedings. While the process of codification proceeds, the Board
should direct its major attention and energies to affirmative rules that
go beyond the usual remedial order prohibitions of undesirable con-
duct.
Disinterested and thoughtful scholars have long urged the Board to
employ rule making. An ever growing case load and backlog make
their arguments today more compelling than ever, while revealing the
Board's existing "custom made" procedures as charming but antique.
ment relations legislation takes place every twelve years-1935, 1947, 1959. A new. statute
in 1971 brought on by Wyman-Gordon would be a big boost for numerology.
158. Indications are that opponents of Board rule making include both management
and union lawyers, while proponents come only from the ranks of management attoms.
Some union representatives may fear that a Nixon Board would be more inclined to
upset doctrines favorable to labor promulgated by the Kenncdy-Johnson Board, as they
are sometimes called. As already noted, I am very dubious that one method offers more
opportunity for politically motivated overruling than another. See p. 597 supra.
159. Non-lawyers should be encouraged to comment. Special attention should be given
to involving members of both management and unions who must live under the Board's
rules. The invitation to comment should stress the Board's desire to hear their views on
subjects on which such parties need guidance and on doctrines which they find unsound.
The case method does not provide a ready means of eliciting laymen's views or of satis-
fying them. It surely will not hurt to ask.
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The Board however has consistently rejected such suggestions, 00 labor
lawyers have not yet evidenced a yen for rule making, and the desires
of the labor laity have never been recorded on the subject. The latest
opinion of an ABA Labor Section Committee (which, however, is not
binding policy) seems decidedly adverse, although about a decade ago
the Section itself had advocated the use of rule making. Congress, mean-
while, has not shown much interest in pressing rule making since the
1946 enactment of the APA. The issue of rule making versus adjudica-
tion, therefore, will probably have to be battled out in the courts, which
will do their best to wrestle some reason out of the APA test, the
Wyman-Gordon case, and the commentary it is sure to evoke. Unfor-
tunately, this will be a case of the wrong issue in the wrong forum with
the wrong data for resolving the problem. The debate over rule making
has been essentially a side show, but now it should be scheduled for
the main tent and should focus on the utility rather than the statutory
necessity of rule making, with special attention to the particular occa-
sions for its use.
The administrative process has not performed up to early expecta-
tions, which probably were overly ambitious. Rule making will not cure
deep seated problems of inadequately expressed Congressional purposes
themselves rooted in unresolved political policy. But rule making may
help reinvigorate agencies now settled into dull, time-consuming, and
relatively unproductive adjudicatory routines that are unequal to grow-
ing case loads and the increasing complexity of the areas to be regulated.
At the very least rule making should be given a trial. We have nothing
to lose but our claims.
160. The Board has not been monolithic on the subject. Former member Joseph A.
Jenkins was an advocate of rule making. Sam Zagoria, who sat on the board until
December, 1969, also seemed favorably disposed to some rule making.
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